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The recent debate over reforming the Securities Exchange Act section 
13(d) ten-day filing window demonstrates the importance of balancing the 
costs and benefits of delayed blockholder disclosure in both 
consequentialist and deontological terms.  While hedge fund activism may 
create shareholder value, short-termism is a very real problem for firms 
today.  Rather than a rigid mandatory rule, the duration of the blockholder 
disclosure window should be set through a shareholder amendment to the 
corporate bylaws that empowers shareholders to set an optimal maximum 
length for each firm.  To internalize the economic and moral costs to 
society of permitting trading on asymmetric information, the SEC should 
impose a filing fee on blockholders utilizing the delayed disclosure 
window and use the proceeds to compensate investors who sold shares 
while a blockholder engaged in a stealth accumulation. 
 
                                                 
* J.D. Candidate, 2013, Yale Law School.  joshua.mitts@yale.edu.  The author would like 
to thank Ian Ayres, Alidad Damooi, and Eric Robinson for providing valuable comments. 
2 
 





































The latest round in the corporate governance tug-of-war between 
management and activist shareholders is the controversy over reforming 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 section 13(d) filing window.  In fall 
2010, activist hedge funds exploited the ten-day window to acquire 26.7% 
of J.C. Penney and 10.9% of Fortune Brands.  By engaging in massive 
purchases between crossing the 5% threshold and the required disclosure 
ten days later, these hedge funds stealthily accumulated shares at a 
discount of nearly $230 million from the post-disclosure market price.1  
More recently, in October 2012, Carl Ichan exploited the ten-day window 
to stealthily acquire 9.98% of Netflix, yielding $52 million in potential 
profit on the stake acquired during the filing window alone.2 
In a recent petition submitted to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”), the law firm Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz 
(“Wachtell Lipton”) requested that the SEC exercise its rulemaking 
powers under the Dodd-Frank Act and shorten the window for filing a 
notice of beneficial ownership to one day.3  Wachtell Lipton argued that 
examples such as J.C. Penney and Fortune Brands demonstrate the 
potential for hedge funds to exploit the ten-day window and stealthily 
accumulate massive blocks of ownership.  Such stealth accumulations 
deprive those who sold shares during the filing window of the premium 
they could have received upon disclosure of the hedge fund’s stake. 
In response to Wachtell Lipton’s proposal, law professors Lucian 
A. Bebchuk and Robert J. Jackson articulated economic justifications for 
the ten-day window.4  Bebchuk and Jackson argued that announcements of 
hedge fund activism correlates with higher share prices, suggesting that it 
                                                 
1 See discussion infra Section II.A. 
2 See id. 
3 Letter from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, U.S. 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 6 (Mar. 7, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2011/petn4-624.pdf. 
4 E.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson Jr., The Law and Economics of 
Blockholder Disclosure, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming, 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1884226. 
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is beneficial for target firms.5  However, because hedge funds do not 
acquire a controlling stake, they cannot capture the entire benefits of 
intervention.6  Bebchuk and Jackson claimed that enabling activist 
shareholders to buy shares at a discount during the ten-day window is 
essential compensation for the beneficial intervention they bring to target 
firms.7  In response, Wachtell Lipton asserted that economic analysis does 
not justify undermining the purpose of the Williams Act.8 
This Article advocates a balanced approach to this debate and a 
novel proposal for regulatory reform.  Securities regulation should neither 
solely promote the historical goals of the 1960s nor consider only the 
benefits of hedge fund activism.  If delayed blockholder disclosure 
functions as compensation for hedge fund activism, determining the 
optimal length of the disclosure window necessitates considering the costs 
and benefits of hedge fund activism—not solely one or the other. 
The benefits are well-known.  As Bebchuk, Jackson, and a 
growing number of empirical finance studies demonstrate, hedge funds are 
particularly effective at mitigating agency costs and increasing shareholder 
value.  They are free from the regulatory restraints and structural 
limitations of traditional institutional investors like mutual funds and have 
strong incentives to obtain outstanding objective returns. 
On the other hand, hedge funds are preoccupied with short-term 
results.  Two scholars put it nicely: “Hedge funds come close to being the 
archetypal short-term investor. For some funds, holding shares for a full 
day represents a ‘long-term’ investment.”9  It is hard to believe that 
managers ignore the pressure from short-term investors simply because 
the efficient markets hypothesis says they should.  But there’s no need to 
resort to intuition: numerous empirical studies in the management and 
                                                 
5 Id. at *13. 
6 Id. at *16. 
7 Id. at *17. 
8 Adam O. Emmerich, Theodore N. Mirvis, Eric S. Robinson & William Savitt, Fair 
Markets and Fair Disclosure: Some Thoughts on the Law and Economics of Blockholder 
Disclosure, and the Use and Abuse of Shareholder Power at *2 (Columb. L. & Econ. 
Working Paper No.  428, Aug. 27, 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2138945. 
9 Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and 
Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1085 (2006) 
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accounting disciplines have shown that short-termism is a problem in 
corporate America.  Even if finance theory says they shouldn’t, managers 
do feel the pressure of short-term earnings.  It is hard to believe that hedge 
funds’ demands for immediate results will have no effect on the long-term 
profitability of target firms. 
Delayed blockholder disclosure also imposes a cost on society.  
Hedge funds stealthily buying shares during the ten-day window are 
trading on asymmetric information, and information asymmetries harm 
everyone in the market by reducing liquidity and raising bid/ask spreads.  
These stealth accumulations are not doctrinally insider trading, but their 
effects are quite similar.  In addition to the chilling effect caused by 
playing a losing game with the deck stacked against unknowing retail 
investors, trading on asymmetric information is fundamentally unfair.  It 
deprives market participants of autonomy by exploiting the non-disclosure 
of material facts regarding the share accumulation by an activist investor. 
Mere participation in a market that legally permits trading on asymmetric 
information does not imply a subjective waiver of the moral entitlement to 
a fully informed decision.  In short, hedge funds profit from inducing 
others to trade on a deceptive premise regarding the status quo when they 
actually intend to upend it—and that imposes a moral cost on society. 
To balance the costs and benefits of delayed blockholder 
disclosure, this Article proposes a private ordering solution akin to the 
approach taken for proxy access under Rule 14a-8.  It may be 
economically efficient for certain firms to permit some delay.  Rather than 
imposing a rigid mandatory rule, the SEC should let shareholders make 
this decision through a shareholders amendment to the corporate bylaws.  
Allowing each firm to decide how long after acquiring a 5% stake 
blockholders can trade before mandating disclosure would empower 
shareholders to incentivize the level of hedge fund activism that would 
maximize the value of their shares. 
Regulators, on the other hand, should focus on the price society 
pays when blockholders engage in stealth accumulations and profit by 
trading on asymmetric information.  This Article proposes imposing a 
filing fee to induce the socially optimal disclosure duration for each firm.  
Under this proposal, hedge funds filing schedule 13D disclosures after 
passing the 5% threshold would pay a fee based on an approximation of 
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the cost this delay imposes on society.  Like a carbon tax on pollution-
emitting factories, a delayed disclosure fee forces hedge funds to 
internalize the social cost of stealth accumulations and tacit deception of 
trading counterparties. 
The proceeds of this delayed disclosure fee should be used to 
establish a compensation fund to ameliorate the injury to shareholders who 
sold during the delayed disclosure window.  While this fund would not 
make injured investors perfectly whole, it would go a long way towards 
offsetting the exploitation of information asymmetries permitted by the 
private ordering system.  The combination of empowering shareholders to 
determine the length of the disclosure window, imposing a filing fee on 
stealth accumulations and compensating victims would bring society the 
benefits of hedge fund activism while minimizing collateral consequences 
to the extent possible. 
Part II of this Article presents an overview of delayed blockholder 
disclosure under section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  
Part III discusses the costs and benefits of hedge fund activism, the 
primary justification for permitting delayed blockholder disclosure.  Part 
IV presents this Article’s private ordering solution and the filing fee and 
compensation proposals.  Part V concludes this Article.   
II. DELAYED BLOCKHOLDER DISCLOSURE UNDER SECTION 
13(D) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 
This Part presents an overview of section 13(d) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, which requires disclosing the acquisition of 
beneficial ownership of more than 5% of a class of reporting company’s 
stock.  It discusses the recent exploitation of this window by two hedge 
funds and the immense profit they obtained.  In addition, this Part 
summarizes the legislative history of the ten-day disclosure window and 
the Dodd-Frank provision that grants the SEC the authority to shorten the 
disclosure window.  It concludes by describing the academic and policy 
debate over this issue. 





Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, 
provides:  
Any person who, after acquiring directly or indirectly the 
beneficial ownership of any equity security of a class which 
is registered pursuant to section 78l. . . or otherwise 
becomes or is deemed to become a beneficial owner of any 
of the foregoing upon the purchase or sale of a security-
based swap that the Commission may define by rule, and is 
directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 5 
per centum of such class shall, within ten days after such 
acquisition or within such shorter time as the Commission 
may establish by rule, file with the Commission, a 
statement containing . . . the following information . . . .10  
The statute defines a series of required disclosure items, including 
identifying information regarding the beneficial owner;11 the source and 
amount of the funds for the purchase;12 whether the purpose of the 
acquisition is to acquire control, liquidate, or perform other “major 
changes” to the “business or corporate structure” of the issuer;13 and the 
number of shares beneficially owned.14  The Securities and Exchange 
Commission has implemented this statute in Regulation 13D of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which provides for filing the beneficial 
ownership disclosure in Schedules 13D and 13G and sets forth the 
technical requirements for filing.15   
 Crucially, section 13(d) does not require filing the disclosure 
statement until ten days after the acquisition of beneficial ownership of 
                                                 
10 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(d)(1) (West 2012).   
11 Id. at § 78m(d)(1)(A). 
12 Id. at § 78m(d)(1)(B). 
13 Id. at § 78m(d)(1)(C). 
14 Id. at § 78m(d)(1)(D). 
15 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13D-1 to 240.13D-102 (2012). 
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more than 5% of the shares of any class.  This permits investors to acquire 
a block of shares substantially greater than 5% prior to the expiration of 
the ten-day window.  As noted in a recent petition to the SEC by the law 
firm Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz (“Wachtell Lipton”), the recent 
examples of hedge fund acquisitions of J.C. Penney and Fortune Brands 
stock dramatically illustrate this phenomenon.16 Two activist hedge 
funds—Pershing Square Capital Management and Vornado Realty 
Trust17—acquired 26.7% ownership of J.C. Penney by exploiting the ten-
day window.  Prior to crossing the 5% threshold, Pershing Square held 
4.9% of J.C. Penney.  During the window, Pershing and Vornado made a 
series of rapid purchases to reach the 26.7% level.18  Similarly, Pershing 
Square went from under 5% to over 10% ownership in Fortune Brands 
during the delayed disclosure window.19   
 The following graphs of the share prices of J.C. Penney and 
Fortune Brands during this time period vividly illustrate these stealth 
acquisitions and profit potential: 
 
                                                 
16 See Letter from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, 
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Mar. 7, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2011/petn4-624.pdf. 
17 While Vornado Realty Trust is technically a real estate investment trust, it functions as 
an activist hedge fund.  See Brad Thomas, Vornado Realty Trust: Simply A Hedge Fund 
In A REIT Wrapper, SEEKING ALPHA (Oct. 15, 2012), 
http://seekingalpha.com/article/923481-vornado-realty-trust-simply-a-hedge-fund-in-a-
reit-wrapper.  
18 Id. at 6 (citing Maxwell Murphy, Deal Journal, How Bill Ackman Stalked J.C. Penney, 
WALL ST. J., October 8, 2010; Joann S. Lublin & Karen Talley, Big Shoppers Bag 26% of 
J.C. Penney, WALL ST. J., October 9, 2010). 
19 Id. (citing Matt Phillips, MarketBeat, Ackman in Action, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 8, 2010); 
David Kesmodel, Fortune Brands Plans to Split Up, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 8, 2010)). 
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Figure 1: J.C. Penney Company Inc. (JCP) 
 
Data Source: Yahoo! Finance.  Date Range: 9/20/2010 – 10/20/2010.20 
 
This chart shows the closing price of J.C. Penney prior to, during, and 
following the ten-day window and section 13(d) blockholder disclosure.  
Pershing Square’s announcement occurred following the close of trading 
on October 7, 2010, as indicated by the green diamond on that day.21  Both 
Pershing Square and Vornado crossed the 5% threshold on September 28, 
2010, as indicated by the red diamond.22  The chart demonstrates that the 
                                                 
20 YAHOO! FINANCE, J. C. Penney Company Inc. (JCP): Historical Prices, 
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=JCP+Historical+Prices (last visited 11/3/2012). 
21 Pershing Square’s schedule 13D was filed with the SEC on October 8, 2010 at 9:15 
AM.  EDGAR Filing Documents: 0000950123-10-092199, Form SC 13D, U.S. 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Oct. 8, 2010), 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166126/000095012310092199/0000950123-
10-092199-index.htm. Vornado Realty Trust’s schedule 13D was filed at on October 8, 
2010 at 5:10 PM.  EDGAR Filing Documents: 0000903423-10-000566, Form SC 13D, 
U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Oct. 8, 2010), 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/899689/000090342310000566/0000903423-10-
000566-index.htm.  
22 See J.C. Penney Co., Schedule 13D: Pershing Square Capital Management, L.P. (Sep. 
28, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166126/000095012310092199/y04041sc13d.ht
m; J.C. Penney Co., Schedule 13D: Vornado Realty Trust (Sep. 28, 2010), available at 
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price of J.C. Penney’s stock remained well below its post-disclosure high 
of $32.49 for much of the ten-day window, permitting these hedge funds 
to acquire much of their 26.7% stake at a substantial discount to the post-
disclosure price. 
 A chart of Fortune Brands’s stock price demonstrates the same 
phenomenon:23 
 
Figure 2: Fortune Brands Inc. / Beam, Inc. (BEAM) 
 
Data Source: Yahoo! Finance.  Date Range: 9/20/2010 – 10/20/2010.24 
 
As with J.C. Penney, this chart shows the closing price of Fortune Brands 
Inc. prior to, during, and following the ten-day window and section 13(d) 
blockholder disclosure.  The announcement occurred after the close of 
trading on October 8, 2010, as indicated by the green diamond on that 
                                                                                                                         
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/899689/000090342310000566/vornado13d_100
8.htm. 
23 Following Bill Ackman’s intervention, Fortune Brands Inc. was broken up and 
renamed to Beam, Inc.  Bruce Schreiner, Fortune Brands Becomes Beam Inc., Sticks To 
Liquor, BUSINESS WEEK (Oct. 3, 2011), available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9Q52TT01.htm.   
24 YAHOO! FINANCE, Beam, Inc. (BEAM), 
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=BEAM+Historical+Prices (last visited 11/3/2012).  
A PRIVATE ORDERING SOLUTION TO BLOCKHOLDER DISCLOSURE 1/10/13 
 
11 
day.25  However, Pershing Square did not pass the 5% threshold until 
October 4, 2010, as indicated by the red diamond.26  Nonetheless, the chart 
shows that Pershing Square was able to acquire the remainder of its stake 
at a substantial discount from October 4 – 7, 2010, as the share price 
remained well below its post-disclosure level during this period. 
 The date range for these charts was chosen to demonstrate 
important aspects of Wachtell Lipton’s proposal to reform the blockholder 
disclosure window.  The period prior to crossing the 5% beneficial 
ownership threshold—from the left edge of the chart (i.e., September 20, 
2010) to the red diamond—would remain untouched by any reform to the 
blockholder disclosure window.  During this period of time, hedge funds 
would be under no obligation to report because they have not crossed the 
5% threshold.  In the debate over reforming the blockholder disclosure 
window, there is no suggestion to lower the 5% disclosure threshold.27   
 Indeed, the purchases of the initial 5% ownership stake by hedge 
funds prior to crossing the disclosure threshold can be at prices that are a 
substantial discount to the market prices that follow the initial public 
announcement of their acquisitions.  In J.C. Penney’s case, for example, 
Pershing Square acquired an initial 4.9% block at an average price of 
$20.69 prior to crossing the 5% level on September 28, 2010, and 
Vornado acquired an initial 6.6% stake in a single call options transaction 
                                                 
25 Pershing Square’s schedule 13D was filed with the SEC on October 8, 2010 at 5:!0 
PM.  EDGAR Filing Documents: 0000950123-10-092199, Form SC 13D, U.S. 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Oct. 8, 2010), 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/789073/000095012310092375/0000950123-10-
092375-index.htm.  
26 See Fortune Brands, Inc., Schedule 13D: Pershing Square Capital Management, L.P. 
(Oct. 4, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/789073/000095012310092375/c06741sc13d.ht
m. 
27 In light of the extraordinary profit that hedge funds can obtain prior to crossing the 5% 
threshold and the economic analysis infra Part III on the costs and benefits of hedge fund 
activism, it is possible that the very existence of a minimum disclosure threshold 
encourages too much hedge fund activism.  Yet changing the disclosure threshold for 
section 13(d) would require congressional action.  Accordingly, this Article focuses on 
the policy debate that is currently being conducted over reforming the section 13(d) filing 
window by SEC rulemaking action alone under section 929R of the Dodd-Frank Act. 
A PRIVATE ORDERING SOLUTION TO BLOCKHOLDER DISCLOSURE 1/10/13 
 
12 
at an underlying purchase price of $26.72 on the same date.28  This would 
have still yielded an impressive profit.  If these hedge funds had sold at 
$33.30, the closing price ten days after disclosure,29 they would have made 
a profit of approximately $147 million and $102 million on their initial 
stakes, respectively.30  Similarly, Pershing Square bought its initial 4.9% 
                                                 
28 All of the calculations in this Subsection are on file with the author.  The share prices 
are taken from Item 5(c) of each hedge fund’s J.C. Penney schedule 13D filing and 
exhibits attached thereto.  J.C. Penney Co., Schedule 13D: Pershing Square Capital 
Management (Sep. 28, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166126/000095012310092199/y04041sc13d.ht
m; J.C. Penney Co., Schedule 13D: Vornado Realty Trust (Sep. 28, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/899689/000090342310000566/vornado13d_100
8.htm.  For call options, the “purchase price” is calculated based on intrinsic value, i.e., 
the sum of the cost of acquiring the option and its strike price, as this represents the 
minimum price at which the buyer could acquire the underlying shares.  Admittedly, 
calculating profit based on call options’ intrinsic value will understate the potential profit 
because the option itself has value.  But the option value is difficult to estimate in these 
cases, as many were over-the-counter options that lack a market price.  Rather than 
include option value in some cases and not others, this calculation errs on the side of 
caution and utilizes the intrinsic value alone. 
29 In most cases, hedge funds would not have sold this quickly.  The existence of this 
higher share price reflects investor expectations that the hedge fund activism will yield 
some type of payoff for shareholders, which presumably takes longer than ten days.  
(That said, the mere entrance of an activist hedge fund could prompt certain reforms that 
shareholders might consider beneficial.)  As discussed below, researchers who believe 
the efficient markets hypothesis often rely on event-day studies which look to share price 
returns in a certain post-event window, e.g., 10 days, to determine whether the event 
creates long-term shareholder value.  See discussion infra Section III.A.1.  While I 
criticize the efficient markets hypothesis, see discussion infra Section III.A.2, it is 
rational to use such a window to calculate a hedge fund’s hypothetical profit.  Even if this 
higher share price does not reflect the creation of fundamental value because markets are 
inefficient, hedge funds could still “sell into” this wave and dispose of the initial 5%.  
Moreover, they could still obtain this profit on the remainder of their shares if the share 
price remained at this level several months later, if, for example, the market had not yet 
internalized the damage that excessive activism would cause.  For a discussion of 
markets’ temporal inefficiency, see discussion infra Section III.A.2. 
30 This is computed by subtracting the total purchase price each hedge fund paid prior to 
and contemporaneously with crossing the 5% threshold from the product of the number 
of shares acquired during this period and a closing price of $33.30 on October 18, 2010.  
The exact trading data utilized for this computation is included in the schedule 13D 
filings and the calculations are on file with the author.  See J.C. Penney Co., Schedule 
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of Fortune Brands at an approximate average price of $42.52.31  If it had 
sold at the 10-day post-disclosure closing price of $54.51,32 it would have 
made a profit of approximately $86.5 million.33  While the latter figure is 
less than the former two,34 both reflect a sizeable payoff for these activist 
hedge funds for acquiring the initial 5% stake at significant discount to the 
post-disclosure price. 
Again, this payoff would remain untouched by Wachtell Lipton’s 
proposal.  Rather, the petition focuses on the additional profit that would 
result from stealthily acquiring additional shares during the ten-day 
disclosure window.  To illustrate how much is at stake, the average price 
of the J.C. Penney shares acquired by Pershing Square and Vornado from 
September 28, 2010 to October 7, 2010 was $29.27 and $27.39, 
respectively.  If Pershing Square and Vornado had sold at the ten-day 
post-disclosure closing price of $33.30, they would have made a profit of 
approximately $193 million and $43 million on the stake that they 
acquired during the 10-day window, respectively.35  Similarly, Pershing 
                                                                                                                         
13D: Pershing Square Capital Management, supra note 22; J.C. Penney Co., Schedule 
13D: Vornado Realty Trust, supra note 22.   
31 The calculations are on file with the author. 
32 This price has been adjusted for stock splits and dividends. 
33 As with J.C. Penney, the computation utilizes the actual purchase price included in the 
trading data attached to Pershing Square’s schedule 13D filing.  See Fortune Brands, Inc., 
Schedule 13D: Pershing Square Capital Management, L.P., supra note 25. 
34 This may have been because the hedge funds took a smaller stake in Fortune Brands 
than J.C. Penney (11% as opposed to 27%), making it less certain that they could bring 
about the type of improvements that would increase shareholder value (at least over the 
short-term). 
35 The calculations are on file with the author.  As with the initial period profit, this 
utilizes the actual trading data reported on the schedule 13D filings.  The computation 
subtracts the total purchase price each hedge fund paid subsequent to crossing the 5% 
threshold (and prior to the 13D filing) from the product of the total number of shares and 
the closing price of $33.30 on October 18, 2010.  The computation treats cash-settled 
total return swaps as common stock for purposes of this calculation, since the hedge 
funds the long party would be able to realize their potential profit by unwinding the 
swaps and acquiring the underlying shares.  One might criticize the use of the $33.30 
closing price as unrealistic because the hedge funds could not sell 21% of the stock 
instantly without moving the price down.  If it is a rough approximation, however, of 
investors’ anticipation of value creation—a proposition this Article accepts with respect 
to short-term expectations—the price would not fall significantly upon liquidation.  
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Square acquired the remainder of its 10.9% stake in Fortune Brands at the 
average price of $49.80 during the period from October 4, 2010 to October 
7, 2010.  Had it sold at the ten-day post disclosure price of $54.51, 
Pershing Square would have made a profit of approximately $51.6 million 
on the stake it acquired during the delayed disclosure period.36  This 
additional profit would be eliminated under Wachtell Lipton’s proposal. 
Finally, shareholder activists continue to exploit the delayed 
disclosure window to acquire large blocks of ownership at a substantial 
discount to the post-disclosure market price.  Most recently, in October 
2012, Carl Ichan stealthily acquired 9.98% of Netflix at an average price 
of $60.01 after crossing the 5% threshold.37  Had he sold at the ten-day 
post-disclosure price of $78.19, Ichan would have made a profit of 
approximately $52 million on the stake he acquired during the delayed 
disclosure period alone. 
B. Legislative History: The Williams Act of 1968 and Section 
929R of the Dodd‐Frank Act of 2010 
The legislative history of the ten-day window suggests that 
Congress did not intend for it to be exploited through stealth 
accumulations.  The ten-day window was enacted by the Williams Act of 
1968, which arose out of a concern with the increasing use of cash tender 
offers to effect hostile takeovers.38  The legislation initially was introduced 
in the 111th Congress by Senator Williams, who condemned “the cloak of 
                                                                                                                         
Accordingly, these reflect a form of hypothetical profit.  It is also a useful measure of the 
injury to trading counterparties who could have sold at the $33.30 closing price.  See 
discussion infra Section IV.C.2. 
36 The calculations are on file with the author, and utilize the same methodology as the 
prior profit computations. 
37 See Greg Bensinger & Ian Sherr, Icahn Takes Stake in Netflix, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 1, 
2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203707604578091032309599550.html.  
38 For a summary of the legislative history of the Williams Act of 1968, see Andrew E. 
Nagel, Andrew N. Vollmer & Paul R.Q. Wolfson, The Williams Act: A Truly "Modern" 
Assessment, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG., at *5-7 (Oct. 
22, 2011), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/files/2011/10/The-Williams-Act-A-
Truly-Modern-Assessment.pdf.  
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secrecy under which” a corporate raider is “permitted to operate while 
obtaining the shares needed to put him on the road to successful capture of 
a company.”39   
As originally proposed, the bill would have required prior notice to 
the Securities and Exchange Commission twenty days before making a 
cash tender for over five percent of the a class of outstanding shares as 
well as disclosure upon acquiring five percent beneficial ownership 
through open market purchases.40  The prior notice requirement led to 
strong opposition from the SEC, which argued that a five-day post-
acquisition notification window would be “less burdensome” and more 
realistic in situations where prior notice might be impossible.41 
Senator Williams subsequently introduced a modified bill to 
require disclosure within seven days of acquiring ten percent beneficial 
ownership,42 followed by another amendment to lengthen the disclosure 
window to ten days.43  These were the substantive terms that were 
ultimately enacted as the Williams Act of 1968.44  Two years later, the 
disclosure threshold was lowered to five percent.45  In Senator Williams’s 
words, “Stock holdings of between 5 and 10 percent in [large public] 
companies are in many instances a controlling interest.  Here the need for 
the full disclosure requirements of the Securities Exchange Act are 
necessary for adequate investor protection.”46  This is the disclosure 
requirement that applies today.47 
The ten-day blockholder disclosure window remained undisturbed 
for thirty years.  In 2010, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which provided in section 929R: 
                                                 
39 111 Cong. Rec. 28258 (Oct. 22, 1965). 
40 Id.; S. 2731, §2, 89th Cong. (1965). 
41 112 Cong. Rec. 19004 (Aug. 11, 1966) (“Indeed, we envision some types of situations 
in which compliance with an advance notice requirement would be impossible, such as 
acquisitions by inheritance or by gift of which the recipient had no advance notice.”). 
42 113 Cong. Rec. 856 (Jan. 18, 1967); S. 510, § 1, 90th Cong. (1967). 
43 113 Cong. Rec. 24664 (Aug. 30, 1967). 
44 Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968). 
45 Pub. L. No. 91-567, 84 Stat. 1497 (1970). 
46 116 Cong. Rec. 3023 (1970). 
47 15 U.S.C.A § 78m(d)(1). 
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(a) BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP REPORTING.—Section 
13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m) 
is amended— (1) in subsection (d)(1)—(A) by inserting 
after ‘‘within ten days after such acquisition’’ the 
following: ‘‘or within such shorter time as the Commission 
may establish by rule’’48 
This language was found in the initial draft of the Investor Protection Act 
of 2009 submitted by House Committee on Financial Services.49  In the 
“section-by-section analysis of the legislation,” the Committee explained 
the rationale behind the inclusion of this provision: 
Section 105. Beneficial ownership and short swing profit 
reporting 
This section provides the SEC with the authority to adopt 
rules to shorten reporting timeframes and help the markets 
receive more timely information concerning substantial 
ownership interests in issuers. This change is important for 
purposes of obtaining more accurate pricing of listed 
securities.50 
It thus appears that the Committee was concerned with the 
potential for mispricing during the ten-day window.  Indeed, as the 
example of J.C. Penney and Fortune Brands demonstrates, the difference 
between the average price during the ten-day window and the price 
following disclosure can be substantial.  In the case of J.C. Penney, 
exploiting this difference led to over $200 million in profit for two activist 
hedge funds.  The Committee’s intent seems plainly directed to drawing 
the SEC’s attention to the potential exploitation of this pricing differential.  
The Dodd-Frank Act also displayed concern for the growing use of 
synthetic instruments such as cash-settled total return swaps, which permit 
the rapid accumulation of equity ownership via indirect means with a 
                                                 
48 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1866, § 929R (Jul. 21, 2010). 
49 H. Rep. No. 111-687, at 6 (2010). 
50 Id. at 76. 
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minimal impact on share prices.51  These have been used by hedge funds 
to acquire large blocks of shares at minimal cost,52 and were utilized by 
Pershing Square in its stealth accumulation of J.C. Penney shares.53  
Section 766(e) of the Dodd-Frank Act specifically authorizes the SEC to 
include “security-based swaps” within the definition of beneficial 
ownership under section 13(d).54  However, such swaps constitute 
beneficial ownership only if the SEC so designates: 
[A] person shall be deemed to acquire beneficial ownership 
of an equity security based on the purchase or sale of a 
security-based swap, only to the extent that the 
Commission, by rule, determines after consultation with the 
prudential regulators and the Secretary of the Treasury, that 
the purchase or sale of the security-based swap . . . provides 
incidents of ownership comparable to direct ownership of 
the equity security, and that it is necessary to achieve the 
purposes of this section that the purchase or sale of the 
security-based swaps, or class of security-based swap, be 
deemed the acquisition of beneficial ownership of the 
equity security.55 
                                                 
51 Cash-settled total return swaps are a form of equity derivatives that transfer the entire 
credit risk and market risk of an asset to the holder without actually acquiring ownership 
of the underlying security.  See, e.g., PATRICIA A. KOVAL, TORYS ON MERGERS AND 
ACQUISITIONS: USE OF DERIVATIVES BY SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISTS (2011), available at 
http://www.torys.com/Publications/Documents/Publication%20PDFs/MA2011-3.pdf 
(describing the use of these swaps by hedge fund activists to acquire exposure to the 
underlying securities without constituting beneficial ownership and explaining how they 
may be easily converted to voting securities).   
52 See, e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin, Dealbook, Big Investors Appear Out of Thin Air, N.Y. 
Times (Nov. 1, 2010) (“The use of derivatives to create stealth positions is even more 
worrisome.”). 
53 See J.C. Penney Co., Schedule 13D: Pershing Square Capital Management, supra note 
22; Maxwell Murphy, Deal Journal, How Bill Ackman Stalked J.C. Penney, WALL ST. 
J., October 8, 2010 (mentioning Bill Ackman’s use of cash-settled total return swaps). 
54 15 U.S.C.A § 78m; Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 
766(e). 
55 Id. (emphasis added). 
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In a recent decision, the Second Circuit left unresolved the 
question of whether cash-settled total return equity swaps 
constitute beneficial ownership under the existing section 13(d) 
and rule 13d-3.56  The potential for rapid stealth accumulations 
during the ten-day window in light of the increasing use of cash-
settled total-return swaps led to a vibrant academic and policy 
debate as discussed in the next Section. 
C. The Academic and Policy Debate Over Shortening the 
Ten‐Day Window 
The current debate surrounding shortening the disclosure window 
began with a rulemaking petition submitted by Wachtell Lipton to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission.57  Wachtell Lipton argued that the 
ten-day window contravenes the purpose of the Williams Act by 
permitting rapid stealth acquisitions of quasi-controlling blocks, which 
was precisely what Congress sought to prohibit by enacting the 
blockholder disclosure reporting requirements.58   Moreover, Wachtell 
Lipton claimed, the recent examples of J.C. Penney and Fortune Brands 
vividly demonstrate that the ten-day window is no longer suited to an age 
where large blocks of shares may be rapidly accumulated, particularly 
when synthetic ownership, e.g. derivatives, permit even faster 
accumulation of net long equity positions.59   
In response, Professors Lucian A. Bebchuk and Robert J. Jackson 
criticized Wachtell Lipton’s petition and advocated that the current ten-
                                                 
56 CSX Corp. v. Children's Inv. Fund Management (UK) LLP, 654 F.3d 276, 284 (2d 
Cir. 2011) (remanding to the district court on different grounds).  But see id. at 301 
(Winter, J., concurring) (“In the absence of some other agreement governing the 
disposition of shares purchased to hedge a swap position, merely having a long position 
in a cash-settled total-return equity swap does not constitute having the power, directly or 
indirectly, to direct the disposition of shares that a counterparty purchases to hedge its 
swap positions, and thus does not constitute having “investment power” for purposes of 
Rule 13d–3(a).”). 
57 Letter from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz to Elizabeth M. Murphy, supra note 16.   
58 Id. at *2. 
59 Id. at *6-8. 
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day period remain unchanged.60  Bebchuk and Jackson claim that the SEC 
should evaluate the suitability of the blockholder disclosure window in 
light of academic research regarding the beneficial role of activist 
investors in public companies.61  They discuss the empirical financial 
literature finding a correlation between hedge fund activism and 
shareholder value62 and argue that the ten-day window functions as a form 
of compensation to blockholders for monitoring and disciplining 
management.  They argue that such compensation is essential because as 
non-controlling shareholders activist blockholders only share pro rata in 
the benefits of their activism.63 
This Article advocates a balanced approach to resolving this 
debate.  Wachtell Lipton correctly points out that the purpose of the 
disclosure requirements in the Williams Act was to prevent stealth 
acquisitions.  Yet while the Dodd-Frank Act explicitly empowered the 
Securities and Exchange Commission to shorten the disclosure window, 
the Act did not limit the SEC’s discretion to conforming to the historical 
purpose of the Williams Act.  As a matter of positive law, agency 
rulemaking is more than a historical inquiry into congressional intent.  
Administrative agencies are obligated to consider the costs and benefits of 
various policy alternatives and enact rules that further the public interest. 
More fundamentally, Wachtell Lipton’s descriptive claim (what 
“is”) does not imply a normative outcome (what “should be”).  Even under 
the extreme assumption that the SEC must, as a matter of positive law, 
                                                 
60 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson Jr., The Law and Economics of Blockholder 
Disclosure, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 39 (2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1884226.  In a recent reply, four 
partners from Wachtell Lipton reiterate their argument that Bebchuk & Jackson’s cost-
benefit analysis is flawed because it is “missing” “any explanation of how their position – 
their conception of how the Section 13(d) reporting rules should operate – is consistent 
with the clear purpose of the statute.”  Adam O. Emmerich, Theodore N. Mirvis, Eric S. 
Robinson & William Savitt, Fair Markets and Fair Disclosure: Some Thoughts on the 
Law and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure, and the Use and Abuse of Shareholder 
Power, (Columb. L. & Econ. Working Paper No.  428, Aug. 27, 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2138945.  
61 Id. at *12. 
62 See discussion infra Section III.A. 
63 Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 21, at *16-19. 
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shorten the disclosure window because technological innovations render 
the letter of the law no longer effective at fulfilling its purpose, this does 
not imply that a shorter disclosure window necessarily would be in firms’ 
or society’s best interest.  Put differently, Congress may have erred.  
Blockholder disclosure ultimately may not be socially beneficial.  Apart 
from the doctrinal question of what the SEC is bound by law to consider 
as an administrative agency, it is essential to address the normative 
question of what is best for society.   
Answering this normative question requires finding a justification 
external to the descriptive content of the law itself.  The law-and-
economics methodology prevalent in corporate and securities law 
generally assumes that promoting Kaldor-Hicks efficiency—i.e., 
producing gains to society that exceed losses—should be the normative 
goal that the law advances.64  A proposal to shorten the blockholder 
disclosure window should be justified through economic analysis, not 
solely by pointing to the descriptive content of legislative history. 
To their credit, Bebchuk and Jackson cite to economic and 
financial research to make a normative claim that the ten-day window is 
better for society than a shorter alternative.65  Yet they look solely at the 
benefits of hedge fund activism without considering the costs that 
activism—particularly excessive activism—may impose.66  It is 
impossible to compare the ten-day window to a shorter period without 
evaluating the costs and benefits of both alternatives.   
As described in Sections III.B and III.C, if the current regime 
encourages excessive activism, there are two potential sources of costs: (1) 
harm to target firms in the form of managerial short-termism, which may 
not be reflected in empirical event-day studies if markets are inefficient; 
and (2) social externalities such as chilling effects among market 
participants resulting from trading on asymmetric information and the 
non-economic harm of depriving trading partners of autonomy.  Without 
                                                 
64 See generally Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency 
Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 488 (1979). 
65 Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 21, at *12 (citing studies). 
66 Interestingly, when Bebchuk & Jackson discuss “costs,” they are referring to the 
potential costs of Wachtell Lipton’s proposal, not to the social cost imposed by the status 
quo of ten-day delayed disclosure on firms and society.  Id. at *17. 
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discussing these potential costs, the net social utility resulting from the 
ten-day window remains unknown, even if empirical studies suggest that 
hedge fund activism does bring value to firms under certain conditions. 
III. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF DELAYED BLOCKHOLDER 
DISCLOSURE 
This Part discusses the costs and benefits of delayed blockholder 
disclosure.  Hedge fund activism may create value by monitoring and 
disciplining management, but these benefits must be balanced against the 
potential for inducing short-termism among target firms.  Moreover, 
delayed blockholder disclosure imposes economic and non-economic 





Many scholars consider hedge fund activism beneficial because 
large blockholders have natural incentives to monitor and discipline 
management, which can reduce the principal/agent problem inherent in 
corporate governance.  Ever since Jensen & Meckling’s seminal 
discussion of agency costs resulting from the separation of ownership 
from control,67 corporate governance scholars have sought ways to 
encourage monitoring incentives in firms with disparate ownership such as 
publicly traded companies.68  Many have pointed to the threat of a hostile 
takeover as an effective means of disciplining management, noting that 
“[e]conomic analysis and evidence indicate that the market for corporate 
control is benefitting shareholders, society, and the corporate form of 
                                                 
67 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs And Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976). 
68 Leading studies on this problem include Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the 
Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, 
Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983). 
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organization.”69  The basic theory is that unhappy shareholders can sell 
their shares to a hostile bidder and thereby effect a change of management 
once that bidder obtains a controlling block of stock.  Empirical event-day 
studies have shown support for the hypothesis that hostile bidders create 
value for target firms.70 
There are many similarities between takeovers and hedge fund 
activism, most notably that blockholders have a greater incentive than 
other shareholders to monitor management in order to maximize the value 
of their shares.71  However, regulatory and structural constraints such as 
conflicts of interests limit the effectiveness of activism by traditional 
institutional investors like mutual funds, e.g., when the target firm’s 
management is a client of these funds’ parent financial institutions.72  
Recently, hedge funds have stepped into this void, largely free of these 
constraints and with compensation structures that make them able to 
“benefit directly and substantially from achieving high absolute returns.”73 
 Consistent with this hypothesis, empirical studies have found a 
correlation between announcements of hedge fund activism and stock 
price increases.  In a recent study, Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy 
                                                 
69 Michael C. Jensen, Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences, 2 J. ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES 21 (1988); see also FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1996); Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of 
Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323 (1986). 
70 Clifford G. Holderness & Dennis P. Sheehan, Raiders or Saviors? The Evidence on Six 
Controversial Investors, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 555 (1985). 
71 For a comprehensive discussion, see Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds 
in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1048-69 
(2006). 
72 Id. at 1048 (citing Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of 
Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 813-816 (1992); Edward B. Rock, 
The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. 
L.J. 445 (1991)); see also Stuart Gillan & Laura T. Starks, Corporate Governance 
Proposals And Shareholder Activism: The Role Of Institutional Investors, 57 J. FIN. 
ECON. 275 (2000); see generally Anat R. Admati et al., Large Shareholder Activism, Risk 
Sharing, and Financial Market Equilibrium, 102 J. POL. ECON. 1097 (1994); Bernard S. 
Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520 (1990); Ronald J. 
Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for 
Institutional Investors, 43 STAN L. REV. 863 (1991). 
73 Kahan & Rock, supra note 38, at 1065. 
A PRIVATE ORDERING SOLUTION TO BLOCKHOLDER DISCLOSURE 1/10/13 
 
23 
and Randall Thomas found abnormal returns of 7% from 13D filings 
revealing activist hedge fund investments using an event-day methodology 
with a window of +/- 20 days.74  This study utilized an original dataset and 
contains several interesting findings, including that a median maximum 
ownership stake of 9.1% and a 95th percentile ownership stake of 31.5%, 
suggesting that activist hedge funds are not seeking to acquire their 
targets.75  Similarly, April Klein and Emanuel Zur find that targets of 
activist investors (including hedge funds and other types of private 
investors) “earn 10.2% average abnormal stock returns during the period 
surrounding the initial Schedule 13D.”76  Both of these studies find that 
abnormal results hold in the one-year period following the schedule 13D 
announcement.77  Other studies show indirect benefits from outside 
blockholder activism.78 
                                                 
74 Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm 
Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 1730 (2008); see also Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund 
Activism: A Review, 4 FOUNDATIONS AND TRENDS IN FINANCE 185 (2009). 
75 Id. at 1732. 
76 April Klein & Emanuel Zur, Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and 
Other Private Investors, 64 J. FIN. 187, 188 (2009). 
77 Brav et al., supra note 74, at 1730-31; Klein & Zur, supra note 76, at 188.  Brav et al. 
maintain an updated table reporting long-term average returns for targets of hedge fund 
activism and claim that “the evidence clearly refutes the market over-reaction hypothesis 
and supports the hypothesis that hedge fund activism creates value for shareholders.”  
Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism: Updated Tables and Figures, at *10, available at 
http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/%7Ebrav/HFactivism_March_2012.pdf (last visited Sep. 
16, 2012).  However, Brav et al. utilize a calendar-time portfolio holding methodology. 
Id. (“We report regression estimates and t-statistics from equal- and value-weighted 
calendar-time portfolio regressions.”).  The use of a calendar-time portfolio method has 
been criticized because “in nonrandom samples, the calendar-time portfolio methods 
often yield misspecified test statistics.”  John D. Lyon, Brad M. Barber & Chih-Ling 
Tsai, Improved Methods for Tests of Long-Run Abnormal Stock Returns, 54 J. FIN. 165, 
193 (1999).  The dataset utilized by Brav et al. is plainly a nonrandom sample, as it 
consists of “236 activist hedge funds and 1,059 hedge fund-target pairs for the period 
2001 to 2006, involving 882 unique target companies.”  Brav et al., supra note 74, at 
1739.  Accordingly, long-run inference based on calendar-time portfolio methods should 
be viewed with suspicion. 
78 Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 21, at *13-14 (citing Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil 
Mullainathan, Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are, 116 Q. J. 
ECON. 901, 903 (2001); Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Lucky CEOs and Lucky Directors, 65 
J. FIN. 2363, 2365 (2010); James A. Brickley et al., Ownership Structure and Voting on 
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 While it is not without controversy,79 the use of event-day studies 
is prevalent in corporate governance studies.80  As two prominent scholars 
put it, “Event studies, relying on the efficient markets hypothesis, assume 
that public information is incorporated into stock prices and that stock 
prices change when new information is revealed.”81  The efficient markets 
hypothesis implies that the positive abnormal returns found in the studies 
by Brav et al. and Klein and Zur reflect the creation of fundamental 
value.82  The market’s response to hedge fund activism—bidding up the 
price of target firm shares—is efficient.  It is incorporating all available 
public information and concluding that hedge fund activism will improve 
the future cash flow of shareholders of target firms.  Brav et al. and Klein 
and Zur generally assume that the efficient markets hypothesis is accurate, 
as indicated by their conclusion that these abnormal returns unequivocally 
establish that hedge fund activism creates shareholder value.83 
2. Inefficient Markets and Long‐Term Value Creation  
The problem with relying on event-day studies as conclusive 
evidence that hedge funds create shareholder value is that there is a vast 
                                                                                                                         
Antitakeover Amendments, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 267 (1988); Anil Shivdasani, Board 
Composition, Ownership Structure, and Hostile Takeovers, 16 J. ACCT. & ECON. 167 
(1993); Anup Agrawal & Tareque Nasser, Blockholders on Boards and CEO 
Compensation, Turnover and Firm Valuation (Nov. 27, 2011), available at 
http://bama.ua.edu/~aagrawal/IDB-CEO.pdf (unpublished manuscript)).   
79 See infra Subsection III.B.2. 
80 See Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the Law: Part II: Empirical 
Studies of Corporate Law, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 380 (2002). 
81 Id. at 398. 
82 For a traditional overview of the efficient markets hypothesis from one of its most 
ardent defenders, see Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: II, 46 J. FIN. 1575 
(1991); Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical 
Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970). 
83 Brav et al., supra note 74, at 1732 (“Our findings have important implications for the 
policy debate about hedge fund activism. . . . our results suggest that activist hedge funds 
are not short-term holders. Activists also appear to generate substantial value for target 
firm shareholders.”); Klein & Zur, supra note 76, at 192 (“Generally, a firm’s stock price 
increases around the 13D filing date that identifies a new blockholder, indicating that the 
market interprets this event as value increasing.”). 
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body of behavioral finance literature that calls the efficient market 
hypothesis into question.84   This research began with drawing attention to 
empirical anomalies in the data utilized to support the efficient markets 
hypothesis in the traditional studies.85   Behavioral finance scholars found 
evidence supporting short-term momentum and “feedback,” the tendency 
for asset prices to form a bubble based on ever-increasing expectations of 
higher prices, only to come crashing down thereafter.86  Theoretical 
models were developed to demonstrate the limitations of arbitrage to 
correct these anomalies as predicted by the efficient markets hypothesis, 
and these models were supported by empirical studies.87  The asset 
bubbles of the late 1990s and 2000s in technology stocks and the housing 
market led to a rejection of the efficient markets hypothesis yet again.88  
                                                 
84 For an overview of the behavioral finance criticism of the efficient markets hypothesis, 
see Robert J. Shiller, From Efficient Markets Theory to Behavioral Finance, 17 J. ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES 83 (2003).  
85 See id. at 84 (discussing the empirical anomalies in Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital 
Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970)); Lawrence H. 
Summers, Does the Stock Market Rationally Reflect Fundamental Values?, 41 J. FIN. 591 
(1986). 
86 E.g., Werner F. M. De Bondt & Richard H. Thaler, Does the Stock Market Overreact?, 
40 J. FIN. 793 (1985); Narasimhan Jegadeesh & Sheridan Titman, Returns to Buying 
Winners and Selling Losers: Implications for Stock Market Efficiency, 48 J. FIN. 65 
(1993). See generally Shiller, supra note 84, at 96. 
87 E.g., Nicholas Barberis & Andrei Shleifer, Asset Pricing Model with Stochastic 
Consumption and Investment Opportunities, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 265 (2000); J. Bradford De 
Long, Andrei Shleifer, Lawrence H. Summers & Robert J. Waldmann, Noise Trader Risk 
in Financial Markets, 98 J. POL. ECON. 703 (1990); William N. Goetzmann & Massimo 
Massa, Daily Momentum And Contrarian Behavior Of Index Fund Investors, 37 J. FIN. & 
QUANT. ANALYSIS 375 (2002).  See generally Shiller, supra note 84, at 96-97. 
88 E.g., ROBERT J. SCHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2000); Paul Krugman, How Did 
Economists Get It So Wrong?, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 2, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/06/magazine/06Economic-t.html.  Paul Krugman 
summed it up nicely: “In a 2007 interview, Eugene Fama, the father of the efficient-
market hypothesis, declared that ‘the word ‘bubble’ drives me nuts,’ and went on to 
explain why we can trust the housing market . . . In short, the belief in efficient financial 
markets blinded many if not most economists to the emergence of the biggest financial 
bubble in history. And efficient-market theory also played a significant role in inflating 
that bubble in the first place.”  Krugman, supra.  See also Geoffrey Hodgson, Reforming 
Economics after the Financial Crisis, 2 GLOBAL POLICY 190 (May 2011). 
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These developments in behavioral finance suggest that the 
empirical results championed in support of the notion that hedge fund 
activism creates shareholder value should be viewed with suspicion.  
Increases in target firm share prices upon schedule 13D announcements 
may be irrational rather than reflecting increased fundamental value.  
Purchasers may be overly optimistic regarding the long-term benefits of 
hedge fund activism or anticipate that counterparties in future transactions 
will be overly optimistic and pay more than the fundamental value of these 
shares.  In the latter case, bidding up the price of the stock would be 
rational for current purchasers who anticipate an irrational overpayment 
by subsequent acquirers.  Indeed, empirical studies have found that 
investors systematically overvalue takeover targets.89  An intertemporal 
transfer payment from future to current shareholders does not reflect an 
increase in fundamental value. 
Incidentally, a schedule 13D filing signals that it is more likely that 
a firm will undergo a takeover or other change-of-control transaction 
where a control premium would be paid.  Filing a schedule 13D disclosure 
rather than a schedule 13G disclosure implies that the purchaser has the 
“purpose” or “effect” of “changing or influencing the control of the 
issuer.”90  The implied control intent in a schedule 13D filing and the 
increased likelihood of a control premium payoff likely explains much of 
the share price bounce.91  But this sheds no light on whether hedge fund 
activism creates fundamental value for target firms over the long-term. 
                                                 
89 E.g., James S. Ang & Yingmei Cheng, Direct Evidence On The Market-Driven 
Acquisition Theory, 29 J. FIN. RESEARCH 199 (2006); Ming Dong et al., Does Investor 
Misvaluation Drive the Takeover Market?, 61 J. FIN. 725 (2006); Andrei Shleifer & 
Robert W. Vishny, Stock Market Driven Acquisitions, 70 J. FIN. ECON. 295 (2003). 
90 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(c)(1).  Rule 13d-1 permits filing a schedule 13G if the acquirer 
“[h]as not acquired the securities with any purpose, or with the effect, of changing or 
influencing the control of the issuer, or in connection with or as a participant in any 
transaction having that purpose or effect . . . other than activities solely in connection 
with a nomination under § 240.14a–11.”  Id.  
91 Cf. Adam O. Emmerich, et al., supra note 53, at *10 (“[A]ctivist 13D filers often 
agitate for some corporate change – for example, a sale of the company or 
recapitalization – that may be expected to have a short-term, positive effect on a 
company’s stock price.”); see also Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Large 
Shareholders and Corporate Control, 94 J. POL. ECON. 461 (1986) (discussing the 
dynamics of large blockholders and the likelihood of a change-of-control). 
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More fundamentally, a balanced approach to evaluating the 
optimality of the blockholder disclosure window requires considering 
whether hedge fund activism always benefits target firms.  Even if hedge 
fund intervention sometimes creates value, there might be an aggregate 
level of activism that on balance does more harm than good.  As discussed 
in the next Section, the potential for hedge fund activism to induce short-
termism suggests that it may not always be beneficial. 
B. Destroying Value Through Short‐Termism: A Summary of 
the Management and Accounting Research 
Largely missing from the legal debate over shortening the 
blockholder disclosure window is the body of management and accounting 
research that demonstrates that short-termism is a very real problem faced 
by firms today.  The legal literature has recognized short-termism as a 
possibility: a well-known law review article on hedge fund activism 
identified short-termism as the only “potentially serious problem” that 
might require regulatory redress but concluded that “a sufficient case for 
legal intervention has not been made.”92  These authors argued that it is 
unclear whether the stock market suffers from myopia, i.e., whether it 
undervalues long-term profit in favor of short-term profit.93  They 
remained unconvinced that myopia exists and raised the possibility that 
“allegations of myopia are a foil for managerial failure to deliver 
results.”94  However, they acknowledge the theoretical and empirical 
                                                 
92 Kahan & Rock, supra note 38, at 1022, 1068, 1089.  For additional analyses of short-
termism, see Lynne Dallas, Short-Termism, The Financial Crisis, and Corporate 
Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 264 (2011); Emeka Duruigbo, Tackling Shareholder Short-
Termism and Managerial Myopia (unpublished manuscript, Apr. 4, 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1802840; Kent Greenfield, The 
Problem of Short-Termism (unpublished manuscript, Oct. 1, 2011), available at 
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1378&context=lsfp (last 
visited Sep. 16, 2012). 
93 Id. at 1084-85. 
94 Id. at 1085 (citing Barry Rosenstein, Activism Is Good for All Shareholders, FIN. 
TIMES, Mar. 10, 2006, at 17). 
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support in the finance literature for the existence of market myopia95 and 
suggest that the growth of private equity firms indicates that myopia 
indeed may be a “serious problem.”96 
Yet there is a body of management and accounting research 
dedicated specifically to short-termism.97  In a 1996 article, management 
scholar Kevin J. Laverty developed five theoretical explanations for how 
suboptimal short-termism might exist within a firm: flawed management 
practices, managerial opportunism, stock market myopia, fluid and 
impatient capital, and information asymmetries.98  Laverty argued that 
short-termism results from the problem of “intertemporal choice,” when 
there are “decisions in which, with respect to maximizing profit or 
achieving some other objective, the course of action that is best in the 
short term is not the same course of action that is best over the long run.”99  
Laverty concluded that short-termism is caused by a complex interaction 
of individual, organizational, and economic factors, necessitating a 
research agenda that focuses specifically on how managers respond to the 
challenge of intertemporal choice.100 
                                                 
95 Id. (citing Richard E. Kihlstrom & Michael L. Wachter, Why Defer to Managers? A 
Strong-Form Efficiency Model (Univ. Pa. Law Sch. Inst. for Law & Econ., Research 
Paper No. 05-19, 2005); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Equilibrium Short 
Horizons of Investors and Firms, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 148 (1990); Jeremy C. Stein, 
Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior, 104 
Q.J. ECON. 655 (1989); Jeremy C. Stein, Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia, 96 J. 
POL. ECON. 61 (1988)).  Nonetheless, despite citing the accounting literature 
demonstrating the empirical existence of myopia as we describe infra, Kahan & Rock 
maintain that “the empirical evidence on the extent and magnitude of myopia is sketchy 
at best.” Id.  
96 Id. at 1086. 
97 Adherents to the efficient markets hypothesis will likely object that markets “see 
through” accounting techniques and should internalize all available information about the 
effect of short-termism, such that finance is the only discipline required to determine 
whether a given phenomenon increases shareholder value.  Yet as explained supra 
Section III.A.2, the efficient market hypothesis largely lacks empirical support whereas 
the existence of market myopia is based on theoretical and empirical research. 
98 Kevin J. Laverty, Economic “Short-Termism”: The Debate, The Unresolved Issues, 
and the Implications For Management Practice And Research, 21 ACADEMY OF MGM’T 
REV. 825, 835 (1996).   
99 Id. at 828. 
100 Id. at 847. 
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Management scholar Brian Bushee at the Wharton School 
subsequently found substantial empirical support for the link between the 
short-term orientation of certain institutional investors (e.g. hedge funds) 
and managerial short-termism within firms.  In a 1998 article published in 
the Accounting Review, Bushee showed that “predominant ownership by 
‘transient’ institutions—which have high portfolio turnover and use 
momentum trading strategies . . . significantly increases the likelihood that 
managers cut R&D to manage earnings.”101  Hedge funds are the 
prototypical type of “transient” institutional investor, often holding shares 
for less than one day.102  In a subsequent piece, Bushee found further 
empirical support for a correlation between transient institutional 
blockholding and managerial myopia:  
The results indicate that high levels of ownership by 
transient institutions are associated with overweighting of 
the near-term earnings component of value and 
underweighting of the long-term earnings component. The 
future-returns test finds trading strategy returns that are 
consistent in sign with mispricing and statistically 
significant two, three, and four years after the portfolio 
formation date. Thus, transient institutions not only exhibit 
strong preferences for near-term earnings, but these 
preferences also translate into significant misvaluations.103  
Bushee’s findings are consistent with other empirical studies that suggest a 
correlation between transient institutional ownership and a willingness to 
inflate short-term earnings.104 
                                                 
101 Brian Bushee, The Influence of Institutional Investors on Myopic R&D Investment 
Behavior, 73 ACCTG. REV. 305, 307 (1998). 
102 Kahan & Rock, supra note 38, at 1083 (“Hedge funds come close to being the 
archetypal short-term investor. For some funds, holding shares for a full day represents a 
‘long-term’ investment.”) (citing Raagas De Ramos, Concerns over Hedge Funds Rise as 
Market Volatility Rises Globally, WALL ST. J., June 15, 2006, at C5). 
103 Brian J. Bushee, Do Transient Investors Prefer Near-Term Earnings over Long-Run 
Value?, 18 CONTEMP. ACCTG. RESEARCH 207 (2001). 
104 E.g., Victor L. Bernard & Jacob K. Thomas, Evidence That Stock Prices Do Not Fully 
Reflect The Implications Of Current Earnings For Future Earnings, 13 J. ACCTG. & 
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These results do not imply that markets always inefficiently 
ascribe more value to short-term results.  The finance research cited by 
Bebchuk and Jackson is not necessarily erroneous.  Even if hedge fund 
activism has historically benefitted companies on average, technological 
advances and innovations in synthetic ownership may have just now 
rendered the ten-day window an incentive for a superoptimal level of 
activism.  Markets may have not yet internalized the detrimental effects of 
aggregate levels of excessive hedge fund activism.  While empirical 
research demonstrates that short-termism may impose a cost on firms 
subject to hedge fund intervention, this cost need not be constant and may 
rise proportionately with the overall level of hedge fund activism.  This 
could occur, for example, if managers tend to be more myopic to the 
extent they observe higher aggregate levels of aggregate activism. 
This relationship may not be linear or even continuous: it may 
“jump up” at certain levels of aggregate activism if, for example, CEOs 
observe a “critical mass” of hedge fund activism and dramatically increase 
the focus on short-term earnings after this level.  The historically positive 
correlation between hedge fund schedule 13D announcements and target 
firm share prices may simply indicate that the market is inefficiently 
misestimating the shape of this “cost curve,” i.e., the distribution of the 
cost of short-termism resulting from this higher aggregate level of overall 
hedge fund intervention.105  Regulatory policy must take into 
consideration the potential for detrimentally excessive activism in the 
future, even if markets have yet to do so. 
In short, despite the difficulty of reconciling short-termism with 
the efficient markets hypothesis, a substantial body of research suggests 
that hedge funds’ focus on short-term earnings encourages managerial 
myopia.  As a matter of regulatory policy, any consideration of the costs 
and benefits of delayed blockholder disclosure would be incomplete 
without weighing the potential harm caused by short-termism. 
                                                                                                                         
ECON. 305 (1990); Katherine Guthrie & Jan Sokolowsky, Large Shareholders and the 
Pressure to Manage Earnings, 16 J. CORP. FIN. 302 (2010);  see also Lynn Stout, The 
Mythical Benefits Of Shareholder Control, 93 VIRGINIA L. REV. 789 (2007). 
105 For an example of such a cost curve, see discussion infra Section IV.A. 




In addition to potentially destroying long-term shareholder value 
by facilitating excessive hedge fund activism, delayed blockholder 
disclosure imposes social externalities as well.  Delayed disclosure is 
similar to insider trading because during the ten-day window the hedge 
fund is trading on the material, nonpublic information regarding its 
accumulated holdings.  Moreover, unlike with insider trading, there is no 
possible benefit from the dissemination of inside information regarding 
the company.106  As the debate over reforming the section 13(d) disclosure 
window concerns regulatory policy, it is essential to consider these social 
effects as well. 
1. Impairing Liquidity, Higher Transaction Costs and 
Chilling Effects 
Similar to insider trading, delayed blockholder disclosure permits 
trading on asymmetric information.  When a hedge fund accumulates 
more than 5% beneficial ownership and trades without disclosing this 
ownership information, it captures the entire premium that would have 
accrued to the share price were this information regarding its level of 
ownership disclosed immediately.  Admittedly, trading during the ten-day 
window does not constitute insider trading as a matter of doctrinal law.  
Insider trading doctrine requires a violation of a fiduciary duty or other 
duty of trust and confidence under either the classical or misappropriation 
theory.107  There is no such fiduciary duty as a matter of doctrinal law 
when material nonpublic information is created by an outside investor. 
                                                 
106 See discussion infra p. 34. 
107 See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980) (explaining that insider 
trading liability arises from violating a duty to disclose which is present only when there 
is a relationship of agency, fiduciary, or a “ person in whom the sellers had placed their 
trust and confidence“) relationship of trust and confidence”); United States v. O’Hagan, 
521 U.S. 642, 663 (1997) (“[M]isappropriation theory bars only ‘trading on the basis of 
information that the wrongdoer converted to his own use in violation of some fiduciary, 
contractual, or similar obligation to the owner or rightful possessor of the information.’”) 
(quoting Barbara Bader Aldave, Misappropriation: A General Theory of Liability for 
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However, an economic justification for the prohibition on insider 
trading is that trading on asymmetric information leads to increased 
transaction costs and reduced liquidity as market makers adjust the bid/ask 
spread to compensate for losses in trading with insiders holding superior 
information about the share price.108  In the words of one scholar: 
The far more serious concern regarding the harm suffered 
by price-function traders due to insider trading is the 
likelihood that market professionals do not absorb these 
losses themselves, but instead pass those costs on to public 
investors by altering their prices to reflect the risk of insider 
trading borne by market professionals, leading to increased 
bid-ask spreads and a potentially less liquid securities 
market. . . . [A]t least some studies indicate that markets 
characterized by weaker insider trading regimes are less 
liquid than those markets in which prohibitions against in- 
sider trading are stringently enforced.109 
                                                                                                                         
Trading on Nonpublic Information, 13 HOFSTRA L.REV. 101, 119 (1984) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
108 See, e.g. Hayne E. Leland, Insider Trading: Should It Be Prohibited?, 100 J. POL. 
ECON. 859 (1992); Michael J. Fishman and Kathleen M. Hagerty, Insider Trading and 
the Efficiency of Stock Prices, 23 RAND J. ECON. 106 (1992).  The literature on this so-
called “adverse selection” theory is vast.  See generally Stanislav Dolgopolov, Insider 
Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread: A Critical Evaluation of Adverse Selection in Market 
Making, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 83 (2004) (critiquing the adverse selection theory in the 
context of insider trading but also providing a comprehensive review of the literature). 
109 Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fairness, Efficiency, and Insider Trading 95 NW. U. L. REV. 
443 ,469-70 (2001) (citing Laura N. Beny, A Comparative Empirical Investigation of 
Agency and Market Theories of Insider Trading (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with Kimberly D. Krawiec); Utpal Bhattacharya & Hazcm Daouk, The World Price of 
Insider Trading (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Kimberly D. Krawiec)). 
This analysis is accepted even by advocates of considering legalizing insider trading.  
E.g., David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, A Coasian Model of Insider Trading, 80 
NW. U. L. REV. 1449, 1457 (1986). 
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Incidentally, recent theoretical and empirical research suggests that 
information asymmetry raises firms’ cost of capital more generally, 
particularly in imperfect markets.110   
These concerns are particularly relevant to delayed blockholder 
disclosure.  Market participants who sell to hedge funds engaging in 
stealth accumulations of substantial blocks of ownership will have lost the 
opportunity to benefit from the disclosure premium when the beneficial 
ownership is disclosed upon expiration of the ten-day window.  As vividly 
demonstrated by the examples of J.C. Penney and Fortune Bands, this 
post-disclosure premium can be substantial.  As hedge fund activism and 
stealth acquisitions during the ten-day window increase, it is quite possible 
that market makers will price this risk of trading with hedge funds holding 
secret information regarding share accumulations into bid/ask spreads, 
impairing liquidity and raising transaction costs for market participants.   
This is particularly likely in light of the difference between a 
schedule 13D and 13G filing discussed previously.111  By permitting 
trading on asymmetric information regarding an upcoming schedule 13D 
filing, the ten-day window deprives counterparties of the opportunity to 
capture the short-term benefit of the activist’s change-of-control intent.  
The examples of J.C. Penney and Fortune Brands demonstrate how this 
short-term payoff could dramatically move share prices, suggesting that 
the potential loss from trading with a blockholder engaging in a stealth 
acquisition is substantial and thus more likely to affect market liquidity. 
Moreover, as with insider trading, permitting hedge funds to trade 
during the ten-day window without disclosing accumulated share 
ownership and unilaterally capture the premium that would inure upon 
disclosure would engender a distrust of capital markets among investors.  
By undermining the values of equal opportunity and transparency that 
encourage participation in the capital markets, trading on asymmetric 
                                                 
110 E.g., David Easley & Maureen O'hara, Information and the Cost of Capital, 59 J. FIN. 
1553 (2004); John S. Hughes, Jing Liu & Jun Liu, Information Asymmetry, 
Diversification, and Cost of Capital, 82 ACCTG. REV. 705 (2007); Maureen O'Hara, 
Presidential Address: Liquidity and Price Discovery, 58 J. FIN. 1335 (2003); Richard A. 
Lambert, Christian Leuz & Robert E. Verrecchia, Information Asymmetry, Information 
Precision, and the Cost of Capital, 16 REV. FIN. 1 (2011). 
111 See discussion supra p. 12. 
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information could have a substantial chilling effect.  In the words of 
former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt: “Our markets are strong because 
investors are confident of their basic fairness.  Trading on inside 
information . . . damages the entire structure of our markets, because it 
deeply shakes this vital investor confidence.  It can especially demoralize 
individual investors.”112 
Some scholars have criticized this position, arguing that if insider 
trading does not actually harm investors, it cannot have a psychological 
chilling effect.113  But this critique takes a narrow view of harm.  
Economic harm is just one type of harm—loss of trust and confidence in a 
fair market is an independent psychological harm that could lead some 
investors to refuse to participate out of fear of losing to insiders for whom 
the game is rigged.  To use one scholar’s analogy of gambling: some 
investors may indeed choose not to play “without an appropriate 
adjustment of the odds,”114 but that is a loss for society as well, in the non-
economic sense of egalitarian participation in markets.115 
Finally, the primary economic justification advanced by 
proponents of legalization of insider trading—signaling information to 
improve stock price accuracy—does not justify delayed blockholder 
disclosure but rather weighs in favor of immediate transparency.  Under 
this theory, insider trading is beneficial because it acts as a signaling 
device, improving the accuracy of stock prices without forcing firms to 
disclose confidential information.116  Insiders are essentially “selling” their 
                                                 
112 Arthur Levitt, A Question of Integrity: Promoting Investor Confidence by Fighting 
Insider Trading, SEC Speaks Conference (Feb. 27, 1988), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch202.txt.   
113 E.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties Into the 
Federal Insider Trading Prohibition, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1189, 1241 (1995) (“If 
investors are not injured by insider trading, why should insider trading affect their 
confidence in the securities markets?”). 
114 Kenneth E. Scott, Insider Trading: Rule 10b-5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy, 9 
J. LEGAL STUD. 801, 808 (1980). 
115 Cf. Krawiec, supra note 109, at 465 (discussing notion of “informational 
egalitarianism” as fairness-based justification for prohibiting insider trading).  
116 See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF INSIDER TRADING: A 
COMPREHENSIVE PRIMER 66 (2001), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=261277 (citing HENRY MANNE, INSIDER 
TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 77-91 (1966)). 
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material nonpublic information to the market, which improves overall 
market efficiency by making prices more accurate.117   
While this rationale has been criticized,118 it plainly militates in 
favor of disclosure when applied to outsiders holding material nonpublic 
information.  There would seem to be no better way to ensure accurate 
stock prices than forcing immediate disclosure upon acquiring beneficial 
ownership in excess of the 5% threshold.  This Article is not advocating a 
mandatory rule of universal immediate disclosure,119 but the importance of 
price efficiency constitutes yet another cost of delayed blockholder 
disclosure that must be weighed when setting regulatory policy. 
2. Depriving Counterparties of Autonomy 
The foregoing discussion took a strict consequentialist approach, 
i.e., measuring the costs of delayed blockholder disclosure solely by its 
effects on society as a whole.  But there is another source of non-economic 
costs imposed by the ten-day window: the loss of autonomy inherent in 
inducing a counterparty to trade on a deceptive premise.  
In an article in the Columbia Business Law Review, Ian B. Lee 
justifies the prohibition on insider trading on deontological grounds.120  
Unlike the “emotion and empty assertion”121 that characterized the debate 
over insider trading prior to Henry Manne’s economic argument in favor 
of legalization,122 Lee develops a rigorous philosophical theory of fairness 
in markets based on respecting the autonomy of market participants.  In 
                                                 
117 As noted id., further discussion of the signaling effect may be found in William J. 
Carney, Signaling and Causation in Insider Trading, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 863 (1987); 
Dennis S. Corgill, Insider Trading, Price Signals, and Noisy Information, 71 IND. L.J. 
355 (1996); Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock 
Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977 (1992)). 
118 E.g., Robert A. Prentice & Dain C. Donelson, Insider Trading as a Signaling Device, 
47 AM. BUS. L. J. 1 (2010); Roy A. Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price, 53 VA. L. REV. 1425, 
1443 (1967). 
119 For a discussion of this Article’s proposed solution, see infra Part IV. 
120 Ian B. Lee, Fairness and Insider Trading, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 119. 
121 Jonathan R. Macey, Securities Trading: A Contractual Perspective, 50 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 269, 289 (1999). 
122 MANNE, supra note 78. 
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his view, in a fair market, the law should seek to promote the respect of 
autonomy between trading counterparties.123  Under this rationale, Lee 
justifies the traditional legal prohibition on coercion and deception,124 e.g., 
contracts made under duress or fraud.  With respect to trading on 
asymmetric information, Lee argues: 
[I]nformation improves a party’s options . . . in a way that 
goes to the quality of the decision as an exercise of 
autonomy: it strengthens the connection between the 
decision and the eventual outcomes. The closer the 
connection, the more the decision can be said to relate to 
the eventual outcome itself. Conversely, the less informed 
the decision, the weaker the connection between the 
decision and the outcomes and the more attenuated the 
decision-maker's autonomy.125   
Withholding material information that is beneficial to counterparties 
undermines their autonomy by denying them the opportunity to “make 
their choice more autonomous and the transaction, therefore, more 
successful.”126  Accordingly, since securities regulation should promote 
fair markets, it should prohibit any trading “while in possession of 
nonpublic information that would affect the investment decisions of other 
market participants.”127 
 This analysis is not limited to doctrinal insider trading.  Any 
trading on asymmetric information deprives counterparties of autonomy 
by misleading them regarding the nature of their transaction.  The 
company no longer has beneficial ownership x but rather x+h, with hedge 
fund h as a substantial blockholder having a control intent (as evidenced 
by the future filing of schedule 13D rather than 13G).  Moreover, the 
                                                 
123 Lee, supra note 120, at 146-47 (“In a fair market, each participant treats the values of 
neutrality and autonomy not simply as values to which he or she alone is entitled, but as 
values which are to be respected equally for all those with whom he or she trades.”). 
124 Id. at 147. 
125 Id. at 152-53. 
126 Id. at 157. 
127 Id. 
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hedge fund is not merely withholding this information.  It is directly 
thwarting its trading partner’s success by depriving him or her of the 
voluntary choice to wait until the public announcement or demand a 
higher price in light of the expected premium.  Trading on asymmetric 
information regarding beneficial ownership during the ten-day window 
undermines counterparties’ autonomy and frustrates their ability to realize 
a successful transaction by deceitfully capturing the profit they would 
have received with disclosure. 
 Some might object that by participating in a market that permits 
trading on asymmetric information, sellers have voluntarily accepted the 
risk of losing this profit to blockholders engaging in a stealth 
accumulation.  Under this view, there is no autonomy violation because 
sellers implicitly waived any moral right to receive all material 
information by voluntarily participating in a market that permits trading on 
asymmetric information.  But this critique assumes too much: participation 
in a market that legally sanctions trading on asymmetric information does 
not imply a subjective waiver of the expectation to receive all material 
information.  As a legal matter, contract law might impute such consent 
unless a seller specifically opts out in the contract of sale.  But moral harm 
is distinct from legal liability.  A fair market that upholds the autonomy of 
trading participants should presume that counterparties are morally 
entitled to make decisions with the highest possible degree of autonomy, 
i.e., with disclosure of all material information held by counterparties.   
Analytically, this moral presumption is not waived because a 
market legally permits exploitation of information asymmetries.  The legal 
status quo is merely descriptive, and does not imply anything regarding a 
seller’s subjective volition regarding full disclosure.  Consider the example 
of a seller who insists on full disclosure yet trades (unknowingly) during 
the ten-day window.  In light of the seller’s affirmative statement that he 
or she has not waived the moral expectation of receiving all material 
information, it would be difficult to conclude that the sale transaction 
invalidates this explicit expression of will.  The law may not uphold the 
seller’s autonomy—i.e., by giving the buyer the right to trade without 
disclosing its accumulated stake—but that does not imply that the seller 
has voluntarily waived his or her moral entitlement to make a fully 
informed decision.  This analysis is not limited to express objections: in a 
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fair market that upholds counterparties’ autonomy, an insistence on full 
disclosure of all material information should be the default rule.  Unless a 
seller expressly waives his or her moral entitlement to a fully informed 
decision, trading on asymmetric information deprives such a seller of 
some degree of autonomy and thereby causes moral harm. 
This does not imply that hedge funds or other market participants 
are morally obligated to disclose subjective intent, future plans, or 
nonmaterial information.  But delayed blockholder disclosure permits a 
market participant to intentionally withhold objective information 
regarding its share accumulation, knowing that disclosure would have 
affected its counterparty’s trading decision, and then to profit by tacitly 
misleading him or her.  In the case of J.C. Penney and Fortune Brands, 
such non-disclosure led to nearly $300 million in deceptively induced 
profits.128  Such exploitation of trading counterparties undermines the 
mutual respect for autonomy that lies at the core of a fair market.   
Nonetheless, this moral harm does not mean that delayed 
disclosure should be absolutely prohibited.  As Lee acknowledges, there 
may be economic justifications for permitting this moral harm in certain 
circumstances.129  Indeed, he arguably brushes aside bargained-for opt-out 
far too quickly,130 as express waiver of the right to receive all material 
information would fully respect the seller’s autonomy.  But in the absence 
of such express opt-out, there is moral harm from delayed disclosure that 
must be weighed alongside the benefits of hedge fund activism.  It is not 
enough to consider only one half of the equation. 
IV. PRIVATE ORDERING, FEES AND COMPENSATION 
This Part shows why a single mandatory disclosure duration is 
suboptimal and suggests a private ordering approach that would facilitate 
efficiently determining the optimal disclosure length for each firm.  This 
Part also proposes imposing a filing fee to internalize the social cost of 
delayed disclosure and a compensation regime to ameliorate the injury to 
victims of trading on asymmetric information. 
                                                 
128 See discussion supra Section II.A. 
129 Id. at 189. 
130 See id. at 187.  





The suboptimal nature of the current ten-day window is simple to 
grasp intuitively.131  Consider two firms, A and B, with the following 
hypothetical total and marginal firm-specific costs and benefits from 
different levels of blockholder disclosure: 
                                                 
131 The Appendix contains a simple model and discussion of additional problems of 
statistical inference that further demonstrate the challenge with finding an optimal, one-
size-fits-all mandatory disclosure duration. 
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The upper curves reflect a firm’s total cost and benefit from 
blockholder disclosure and the lower curves reflect a firm’s marginal cost 
and benefit, i.e., the cost or benefit from one additional day of delayed 
disclosure.  These graphs reflect the intuitive assumption that marginal 
costs and benefits of delayed blockholder disclosure are generally 
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positive—i.e., hedge funds obtain a greater benefit for each additional day 
of disclosure, which imposes an increasing cost on firms as well.132  These 
graphs demonstrate that the optimal duration for each firm is the number 
of days that maximizes the difference between the total cost and benefit 
curves when the benefit exceeds the cost.  Put differently, the optimal 
duration is the number of days where the marginal benefit from one 
additional day of disclosure equals its marginal cost. 
These examples demonstrate that a universal mandatory 
blockholder disclosure duration is suboptimal because it is over- and 
under-inclusive.  For example, consider a duration of 5 days.  For firms 
like firm A, this would be nearly optimal.  For firms like firm B, it would 
be much less optimal than a shorter duration, e.g., 2 days.  More generally, 
for some firms, the benefit from monitoring and disciplining management 
at a shorter duration would exceed the costs of short-termism.  For others, 
this duration would encourage excessive hedge fund activism, imposing 
costs that exceed the benefits to those firms. 
The costs and benefits of hedge fund activism may vary between 
firms for idiosyncratic, firm-specific reasons.  Certain companies may be 
more vulnerable to managerial slack than others.  A particularly 
charismatic CEO recruited externally may be given greater leniency by the 
board of directors—and thus have greater potential for suboptimal 
performance—than a management team promoted from within on a 
provisional basis.  Conversely, hedge fund activism may be more likely to 
induce short-termism at certain firms if management had previously had a 
challenging experience with dissatisfied activist shareholders. 
One factor common to all firms that affects the costs and benefits 
of hedge fund activism is the degree of antitakeover measures that a firm 
had adopted.  In general, the value of one form of shareholder activism 
depends on the ease at which other forms of activism may be alternatively 
employed to reduce managerial slack.  Antitakeover measures such as 
poison pills and classified boards make it harder to reduce managerial 
                                                 
132 The benefit curve for Firm B demonstrates another possibility, namely that the benefit 
starts decreasing after a certain point in time, i.e., if activism would not be more 
beneficial for the firm if the hedge fund had an additional day of delayed disclosure. 
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slack through the threat of a hostile takeover.133  When strong takeover 
defenses are present, hedge fund activism could provide a firm with a 
greater benefit because it may be one of the few remaining means of 
disciplining management.   
Conversely, when takeover defenses are weak or absent, hedge 
fund activism may exacerbate management’s vulnerability to aggressive, 
activist shareholders seeking to maximize short-term profits.  Accordingly, 
the level of antitakeover provisions may directly determine the costs and 
benefits of hedge fund activism for a given firm.  This is why a private 
ordering solution for delayed blockholder disclosure would be a 
particularly effective approach: the shareholders of each firm are best 
suited to choose the duration that preserves managerial discipline while 
avoiding excessive short-termism in light of the firm’s existing 
antitakeover provisions. 
Interestingly, there is a current trend among public companies 
towards reducing takeover defenses, particularly classified boards.  Efforts 
by the Harvard Law School’s Shareholders Rights Project and the 
American Corporate Governance Institute led to board declassification 
among 21 S&P 500 companies in 2011.134  In its 2012 proxy voting 
summary guidelines, the influential Institutional Shareholder Services 
(ISS) recommends that institutional shareholders vote against director 
nominees who adopt long-term poison pills or refuse to declassify boards 
following shareholder approval of non-binding proposals seeking such 
action.135  This trend towards reducing antitakeover defenses suggests that 
shortening the blockholder disclosure window might be particularly 
                                                 
133 For a discussion of how takeovers reduce managerial slack, see generally Michael 
Jensen, Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences, 2 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 21 (1988); 
David Scharfstein, The Disciplinary Role of Takeovers, 55 REV. ECON. STUD. 185 (1988). 
134 Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Contributing to the Declassification of 21 S&P 500 
Companies: Final Tally of the Results of the ACGI’s 2011 Work, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM 
ON CORP. GOV. & FIN. REG. (Oct. 23, 2012), 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/10/23/contributing-to-the-declassification-of-
21-sp-500-companies-final-tally-of-the-results-of-the-acgis-2011-work/#1.   
135 INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, 2012 U.S. PROXY VOTING SUMMARY 
GUIDELINES 11 (Dec. 19, 2011), available at 
http://www.issgovernance.com/files/2012USSummaryGuidelines.pdf.  
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beneficial to target firms, increasing the likelihood that a majority of firms 
will prefer a default rule of immediate disclosure, as explained below.136 
The following two Sections propose specific regulatory reforms to 
implement a private ordering solution for blockholder disclosure in light 
of the varying firm-specific and social costs of hedge fund activism. 
B. Private Ordering for Firm‐Specific Delayed Disclosure 
This Section proposes a private ordering solution to setting the 
optimal length for the blockholder disclosure window.137  In short, the 
SEC should adopt a default rule of immediate disclosure or disclosure 
within one day of acquiring the requisite beneficial ownership, but permit 
individual corporations to opt-out of this rule through a shareholder 
amendment to the corporate bylaws.  Such an amendment could authorize 
a longer disclosure window up to the statutory maximum of ten days.  A 
shareholder amendment to the corporate bylaws would give shareholders 
the opportunity to maximize the value of their shares if a longer duration 
for blockholder disclosure would in fact do so.  
1. Private Ordering: Background and Proxy Access 
The notion that the securities laws should contain default rather 
than mandatory disclosure rules is hardly new.  As early as 1978, the 
mandatory disclosure requirements of the Williams Act were criticized for 
“diluting the value of the property right in privately produced 
information.”138  In 1987, Jonathan R. Macey and Jeffrey M. Netter 
                                                 
136 See discussion infra p. 48. 
137 Steven Brams and I have argued elsewhere that even a private ordering approach is 
economically inferior to a negotiated transaction facilitated by a bargaining mechanism.  
Steven J. Brams & Joshua Mitts, Law and Mechanism Design: Procedures to Induce 
Honest Bargaining, at *37 (working paper, 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2161045.  However, such an approach is a radical 
departure from the status quo and would require substantial legislative reform.  The 
private ordering solution proposed here can be implemented under the existing statute by 
administrative rulemaking.  See discussion infra p. 46. 
138 Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, 
and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L. REV. 13 (1978).  See also William 
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argued that the mandatory disclosure requirements of takeover intent 
under regulation 13D were unnecessary and socially detrimental by 
deterring bidders and should be replaced by an optional amendment to a 
company’s articles of incorporation.139   
More recently, scholars have advocated competition between 
jurisdictions to permit firms to gravitate to more efficient securities law 
regimes.140  In a similar vein, Ian Ayres and Steven Choi suggest 
regulating so-called “outsider trading” by permitting the traded firm to 
elect to prohibit trading in its shares by informed outsiders such as market 
analysts.141  The approach taken by Ayres and Choi is similar to this 
Article, as they argue for a firm-specific opt-out requiring approval by 
“both a majority of a firm’s board and a majority of a firm’s 
shareholders.”142  This Article makes a similar opt-out argument: delayed 
blockholder disclosure should be permitted on a firm-specific basis 
through a shareholder amendment to the corporate bylaws.143  Indeed, 
Luca Enriques, Matteo Gargantini, and Valerio Novembre advocated a 
similar approach in the European context, suggesting shareholder 
disclosure opt-out by both issuers and Member States.144 
                                                                                                                         
J. Carney, Toward a More Perfect Market for Corporate Control, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 593, 
597 (1984) (criticizing mandatory disclosure of takeover intentions). 
139 Jonathan R. Macey & Jeffry M. Netter, Regulation 13D and the Regulatory Process, 
65 WASH. U. L. Q. 131, 154 (1987) (“Interestingly, no one has ever explained why target 
firms could not themselves provide incentives for bidders to disclose the information 
required by the Williams Act if such disclosure would benefit shareholders.  If 
shareholders of potential target firms find such information of value, they could make 
appropriate adjustments in their firms' articles of incorporation that would require the 
disclosure.”). 
140 E.g., Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the 
International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 914 (1998); 
Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 
107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2402 (1998). 
141 Ian Ayres & Stephen Choi, Internalizing Outsider Trading, 101 MICH. L. REV. 313, 
389 (2002). 
142 Id. at 389. 
143 Unlike Ayres and Choi, this Article advocates for approval of an amendment to the 
bylaws by shareholders alone.  See discussion infra p. 50. 
144 Luca Enriques, Matteo Gargantini & Valerio Novembre, Mandatory and Contract-
Based Shareholding Disclosure, 25 UNIF. L. REV. 713, 736 (2010). 
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In the economic analysis above, adopting a private ordering 
approach is akin to recognizing that no external regulator can find the 
firm-specific optimal disclosure length better than the firm’s shareholders.  
They have a natural incentive to maximize the benefit from delayed 
disclosure—i.e., encouraging hedge fund activism to monitor and 
discipline management—while minimizing the costs of such delayed 
disclosure—i.e., an excessive focus on short-termism which would 
depress the long-term value of their shares. 
Admittedly, this approach assumes the group of shareholders 
required to approve the bylaws amendment are seeking to maximize long-
term value.  It would obviously not apply when a majority of a company’s 
shares are held by investors who themselves have a short-term orientation.  
One way to prevent a simple reversal of the disclosure duration window is 
to require a supermajority for future amendments.145  Yet in the vast 
majority of cases, empowering shareholders to opt-out of immediate 
disclosure would encourage determination of the efficient firm-specific 
blockholder disclosure window duration. 
Interestingly, a private ordering approach to proxy access was 
widely advocated in the debate over the SEC’s now-defunct Rule 14a-11.  
As proposed, Rule 14a-11 would have required the inclusion of 
shareholders’ director nominations in a reporting company’s proxy 
materials.146  Leading corporate law firms and industry groups, including 
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP and the 
Business Roundtable, advocated permitting firms to opt-out of these 
requirements through an amendment to the corporate bylaws.147 This 
                                                 
145 See discussion infra p. 52. 
146 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-60089, 
74 Fed. Reg. 29024 (proposed June 18, 2009). 
147 E.g., Letter from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 10 (Aug. 17, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-263.pdf; Letter from Alexander M. 
Cutler, Chairman & Chief Executive Officer, Eaton Corp., and Chair, Corp. Leadership 
Initiative, Bus. Roundtable, to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 47 
(Aug. 17, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-267.pdf; 
Letter from Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP et al. to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. 
& Exch. Comm’n 1-2 (Aug. 17, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-
09/s71009- 212.pdf.  
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position was echoed by academic scholars, including Lucian Bebchuk and 
Scott Hirst,148 who advocated an opt-out regime with a default rule 
permitting proxy access.149 A broader argument was advanced by D. 
Gordon Smith, Matthew Wright and Marcus Kai Hintze, who advocated 
private ordering through shareholder amendments to corporate bylaws 
more generally.150   
In Business Roundtable v. SEC, the D.C. Circuit struck down Rule 
14a-11, the final version of which did not contain a private ordering 
exception.151  But the changes to Rule 14a-8 remained untouched by this 
decision, which give shareholders the ability to propose bylaws addressing 
election-related matters.152  In essence, the current regime is a de facto 
private ordering system where shareholders may effect changes to election 
procedures by proposing amendments to the bylaws in a company’s proxy 
statement.153  Accordingly, this Article’s private ordering proposal is not 
without precedent, nor is it far removed from positions previously 
advocated by practitioners and the academic community. 
                                                 
148 Lucian A. Bebchuk and Scott Hirst, Private Ordering and the Proxy Access Debate, 
65 BUS. LAW. 329, 351-52 (2010); see also Brett H. McDonnell, Setting Optimal Rules 
for Shareholder Proxy Access, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 67 (2011) (making a similar argument to 
that of Bebchuk and Hirst). 
149 Id. 
150 D. Gordon Smith, Matthew Wright & Marcus Kai Hintze, Private Ordering with 
Shareholder Bylaws, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 170 (2011).  But see Brett H. McDonnell, 
“Private Ordering” Taken a Tad Too Far, 6 FORDHAM L. REV. RES GESTAE 32 (2011) 
(generally supporting but criticizing portions of Smith, Wright & Hintze’s proposals). 
151 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
152 See also McDonnell, supra note 108, at 36 (“For decades, the misbegotten ‘relates to 
an election’ exclusion prevented shareholders from using Rule 14a-8 to propose bylaws 
setting the rules for shareholder elections. The SEC’s recent proxy access rules wisely 
eliminated this exclusion (more or less), and the D.C. Circuit’s recent decision in 
Business Roundtable v. SEC does not change that.”). 
153 See id. at 36 (“Given the stringency of [the new Rule 14a-11], what really mattered 
was amending Rule 14a-8 to allow shareholders to create their own more generous rules, 
and as mentioned, that change remains in place.”).  But see Smith, Wright & Hintze, 
supra note 150, at 185 (discussing other limitations on proxy proposals in Rule 14a-8 and 
advocating their elimination). 





A private ordering solution to blockholder disclosure consists of 
(1) replacing the current mandatory rule of a ten-day window with a 
default rule of immediate disclosure and (2) instituting an opt-out 
procedure.  These two reforms could be implemented by a legislative rule 
within the SEC’s existing authority under the Dodd-Frank Act.  Section 
929R does not proscribe any limitation on the SEC’s rulemaking authority 
other than a ten-day maximum but simply refers to “such shorter time as 
the Commission may establish by rule.”154 
Under the doctrine articulated in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., administrative agencies are shown 
considerable deference when interpreting an enabling statute.155  
Construing section 929R as permitting a firm-specific blockholder 
disclosure duration would likely pass the first step of the Chevron analysis 
for the validity of an agency interpretation of a statute because such an 
interpretation is “unambiguously” implied by the statutory text.156  The 
text of section 929R simply refers to “such shorter time as the 
Commission may establish by rule.”  A straightforward reading of this text 
does not imply that the “time” must be universal and equal for all firms.  
Accordingly, it is likely that an SEC interpretation of section 929R as 
permitting a private ordering system would pass the first step of Chevron. 
Moreover, even if a court were to hold that this interpretation is not 
“unambiguously” implied by the statute, a private ordering interpretation 
would almost certainly be upheld as a “permissible construction of the 
statute.”157  It is clearly not “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to 
the statute.”158  There is no implication whatsoever in the text of section 
                                                 
154 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1866, § 929R (Jul. 21, 2010). 
155 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).   
156 Id. at 843. 
157 Id.  
158 Id. at 844. 
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929R that the disclosure duration must be universal.  Accordingly, the 
SEC’s interpretation would be “given controlling weight.”159  
The default disclosure duration should be set as short as possible, 
e.g., immediately, in order to compel shareholders to opt-out if they wish 
to encourage hedge fund activism.160  The SEC should give effect to 
congressional intent when interpreting the statute,161 and comments by the 
House Committee on Financial Services indicate that the purpose of 
section 929R is to reduce mispricing.162  If the SEC were to retain the 
existing ten-day rule as a default rule, firms would be forced to opt-out to 
impose a shorter duration on blockholders.  As opt-out requires reaching 
shareholder consensus—indeed, a supermajority under this Article’s 
proposal—such an approach would leave more firms with the default ten-
day rule.  This would be less effective at reducing mispricing and 
improving the information available in the market than a default rule of 
immediate disclosure. 
A default rule of immediate disclosure is justified under default-
rule theory as well.  Much literature has discussed how the relationship 
between shareholders and the corporation can be analyzed as 
contractual.163  In a well-known article, Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner 
analyze “untailored defaults,” where default rules are set according to 
                                                 
159 Id. 
160 If immediate disclosure is impractical, one day might be used.  The feasibility of 
immediate disclosure depends on whether the SEC and stock exchanges have the 
technical means to detect intraday accumulation beyond the 5% threshold and can 
facilitate intraday reporting. 
161 See generally CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., 4 ADMIN. L. & PRAC. § 11:33 (3d ed. ) (“Courts 
. . . may be skeptical of an agency's reliance on legislative history as justification for an 
agency's statutory interpretation. . . . [But g]enerally committee reports, particular reports 
from the conference committee, can be helpful indicators of congressional intent.”); Jerry 
L Mashaw, Between Facts and Norms: Agency Statutory Interpretation as an 
Autonomous Enterprise, 55 U. TORONTO L.J. 497, 509 (2005) (“In some instances only 
the skillful deployment of legislative history will permit agencies to fulfill their 
constitutional role as faithful agents in the statute's implementation.”). 
162 H. Rep. No. 111-687, at 76 (2010). 
163 See, e.g., Henry N. Butler, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11 GEO. 
MASON U. L. REV. 99 (1989) (collecting sources). 
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“what the majority of contracting parties would want.”164  These are 
efficient when the gains to the parties for whom the default rule fulfills 
what they would have wanted exceed the loss to the parties who incur the 
cost of contracting around the default.165   
In the context of a private ordering approach to blockholder 
disclosure, it is plausible that immediate disclosure would reflect what a 
majority of firms would prefer and the cost of contracting around this 
default imposes losses less than the gains for firms that prefer a longer 
duration.  This is particularly likely in light of the current trend toward 
declassifying boards and reducing antitakeover protections, which 
increases the likelihood of inducing short-termism among target firms.166   
Admittedly, this is only an intuition.  The SEC should conduct a 
robust empirical study to determine how many firms would prefer a 
default rule of immediate disclosure vs. ten days and the cost of opting-out 
of this default for those firms that prefer to do so.  This study may even 
provide empirical support for setting the default duration at some other 
length, e.g., five days, if that would produce gains that exceeds losses 
under the Ayres and Gertner framework.  Nonetheless, it is likely that a 
majority of firms will prefer immediate disclosure, and the legislative 
history in favor of reducing mispricing suggests that a default rule of 
immediate disclosure is the right starting point for regulatory reform. 
It is essential to consider the precise mechanism for shareholders to 
opt-out of the default rule of immediate disclosure.167  For the SEC to 
implement a private ordering system by administrative rule, this 
mechanism should not require legislative reform.  There are three primary 
possibilities to effectuate an opt-out under Delaware corporate law: an 
amendment to the certificate of incorporation, a board of directors’ 
                                                 
164 Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic 
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 90, 91 (1989) (citing Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. 
Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 
VA. L. REV. 967, 971 (1983)). 
165 See id. at 113-15.  For these parties, an untailored default is a “penalty default” in 
Ayres and Gertner’s terminology. 
166 See discussion supra p. 41. 
167 For a comprehensive discussion of altering rules—i.e., the procedural rules of opt-
out—see generally Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering 
Rules, 121 YALE L.J. 2032 (2012). 
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amendment to the bylaws, and a shareholder amendment to the bylaws.168  
For the following reasons, a shareholder amendment is the best approach 
to effectuate a private ordering solution. 
An amendment to a Delaware corporation’s certificate of 
incorporation requires approval by the board of directors and a majority of 
shareholders entitled to vote.169  Alternatively, a Delaware corporation 
may grant its board of directors the authority to amend the bylaws.170  
However, section 109 of the Delaware General Corporate Law (DGCL) 
provides that shareholders always retain statutory authority to amend the 
bylaws directly: 
After a corporation . . . has received any payment for any of 
its stock, the power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws shall 
be in the stockholders entitled to vote. . . . The fact that 
such power has been so conferred upon the directors or 
governing body, as the case may be, shall not divest the 
stockholders or members of the power, nor limit their 
power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws.171 
 The fundamental reason for preferring a shareholder amendment to 
the bylaws as opposed to an amendment by the board of directors or even 
an amendment to the certificate of incorporation is that requiring approval 
by the board of directors would undermine the effectiveness of a private 
ordering solution to delayed blockholder disclosure.  By definition, the 
interests of shareholder activists are diametrically opposed to some subset 
of existing management.  Otherwise, these activists would take a 
cooperative approach to effectuating corporate change.  In many cases, a 
solid majority of the board of directors may oppose a particular 
shareholder activist’s agenda. 
                                                 
168 This analysis considers Delaware corporate law, as the vast majority of publicly traded 
firms are incorporated there.  Yet the principles would apply elsewhere if the appropriate 
technical adjustments are made. 
169 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1) (2010). 
170 Id. at § 109(a) (“[A]ny corporation may, in its certificate of incorporation, confer the 
power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws upon the directors . . . .”). 
171 Id. 
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These directors may genuinely have shareholders’ best interests in 
mind, although it is possible that directors may oppose hedge fund 
activism simply to avoid being replaced.172  Yet the noncooperative nature 
of the interaction between activist investors and existing management 
suggests that it is difficult to envision a board of directors voting to extend 
the duration of the blockholder disclosure window, even if it were in 
shareholders’ best interest.  More fundamentally, the rationale for a private 
ordering system that encourages some level of hedge fund activism is that 
such intervention ameliorates agency costs between shareholders and 
management.  This implies that the decision to permit delayed blockholder 
disclosure should rest with shareholders alone. 
 The mechanics of implementing private ordering through a 
shareholder amendment to the bylaws are straightforward.173  Under 
section 109 of the DGCL, a majority of shareholders may approve an 
amendment to the bylaws without the board’s consent.174  Technically, this 
could be accomplished by a shareholder submitting a blockholder 
disclosure opt-out proposal in the company’s proxy statement for the 
annual meeting of shareholders under Exchange Act Rule 14a-8.175  The 
amendment would simply state that the firm has elected to extend the 
duration for reporting the acquisition of 5% or more of the beneficial 
ownership of its shares by a certain number of days, up to the statutory 
maximum of ten days.176 
                                                 
172 Hedge fund activist Bill Ackman, for example, frequently agitates for a change in the 
composition of a target firm’s board of directors.  See, e.g., Ben Dummet, Bill Ackman 
Riles Canadians, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 19, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304299304577347831092522236.html 
(describing Ackman’s efforts to replace half the board of Canadian Pacific Railway); 
Rachel Dodes, Penney to Give Activists a Say on Board, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 25, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703555804576101630964337152.html.  
173 For a comprehensive discussion of private ordering through shareholder bylaws under 
current Delaware law and proposals for reform, see generally Smith, Wright & Hintze, 
supra note 150. 
174 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a). 
175 17 C.F.R. pt. 240.14a-8.  This rule consists of a series of questions and answers 
regarding the requirements for submitting a shareholder proposal that a company must 
include on its proxy statement. 
176 There is no economic justification for capping the duration of a private ordering 
blockholder disclosure window.  However, the current statutory framework limits the 
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A shareholder amendment to the bylaws to facilitate private 
ordering for delayed blockholder disclosure would pass the test recently 
articulated by the Delaware Supreme Court in CA, Inc. v. AFSCME 
Employees Pension Plan: “a proper function of bylaws is not to mandate 
how the board should decide specific substantive business decisions, but 
rather, to define the process and procedures by which those decisions are 
made.”177  The duration of the blockholder disclosure window does not 
relate to the substantive business decisions that are reserved exclusively to 
the board of directors.178  It is rather a matter of process and procedure, 
specifically the point in time when a blockholder must disclose his or her 
share accumulation under the securities laws. 
As noted previously, shareholders may wish to enshrine the 
blockholder disclosure opt-out with a supermajority vote requirement for 
any further amendment.  Such a requirement would prevent subsequent 
modification by activist shareholders who may be able to obtain sufficient 
support to reach a simple majority and thereby lengthen the disclosure 
window for future prospective blockholders.  Section 216 of the DGCL 
provides that the “bylaws of any corporation authorized to issue stock may 
specify the number of shares and/or the amount of other securities having 
voting power . . . and the votes that shall be necessary for, the transaction 
of any business.”179  Accordingly, current shareholders may impose a 
                                                                                                                         
duration that the SEC could authorize to ten days.  Section 929R of the Dodd-Frank Act 
only permits the SEC to shorten, not lengthen, the disclosure period.  15 U.S.C.A. § 
78m(d)(1).  If Congress were to consider a statutory reform to section 13(d), it should 
remove this cap because the benefits of blockholder disclosure may justify a longer 
period for certain firms.  But if that is infeasible, a private ordering solution capped at ten 
days could be implemented within the language of the statute.  
177 953 A.2d 227, 234-35. (Del. 2008). 
178 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (“The business and affairs of every corporation 
organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of 
directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of 
incorporation.”). 
179 Id. at § 216(a).  Section 216(a) also provides explicitly for the bylaws to impose a 
higher shareholder vote threshold on non-director election matters: “In the absence of 
such specification in the certificate of incorporation or bylaws of the corporation . . . In 
all matters other than the election of directors, the affirmative vote of the majority of 
shares present in person or represented by proxy at the meeting and entitled to vote on the 
subject matter shall be the act of the stockholders . . . .”). 
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supermajority requirement on future amendments simply by including 
such a provision in the proposal for a delayed blockholder disclosure 
amendment to the bylaws. 
Finally, a shareholder amendment proposed through a public 
company’s proxy statement would be a matter of public record.180  
Moreover, a public company must file a form 8-K upon an amendment to 
its bylaws.181 Accordingly, prospective blockholders could easily discover 
the delayed disclosure duration adopted by a shareholder amendment to a 




To internalize the social cost of delayed blockholder disclosure, 
this Section proposes imposing a fee on the acquisition of shares during 
the delayed blockholder disclosure window.182  In other words, a hedge 
fund that acquires greater than 5% ownership—i.e., by purchasing shares 
of firms that have opted out of the default rule of immediate disclosure, 
when such purchases occur during the period of time authorized by the 
shareholder amendment to the bylaws—would be required to pay a filing 
fee based on the social cost resulting from the acquisition of these shares. 
The computation of the delayed disclosure fee will be considered 
shortly, but its mechanics are straightforward.  The hedge fund would pay 
the fee to the SEC when filing the schedule 13D, which already contains 
several elements necessary to compute the fee: the number of shares 
                                                 
180 See 17 C.F.R. 240a-3(a)(1) (“No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made 
unless each person solicited is concurrently furnished or has previously been furnished 
with . . . A publicly-filed preliminary or definitive proxy statement, in the form and 
manner described in § 240.14a–16, containing the information specified in Schedule 14A 
. . . .”) (emphasis added). 
181 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a–11, 249.308. 
182 From an economic standpoint, such a filing fee would function as a “Pigovian tax.”  
Pigou suggested forcing firms to pay for the social cost of harmful externalities as a 
means to reduce output to the desired level. See, e.g., ARTHUR PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS 
OF WELFARE (1932).   
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acquired and outstanding, percent of beneficial ownership acquired, and 
the date at which the hedge fund crossed the 5% threshold.183  The hedge 
fund would only be obligated to pay the fee for acquiring ownership 
exceeding the 5% threshold.  The hedge fund would compute its total 
purchase price between the date of filing and the date of reaching the 5% 
level, utilizing the existing trading data currently reported in item 5(c) of 
schedule 13D.184  The hedge fund could calculate the fee rate using a 
published table similar to Table 1 below based on the total purchase price, 
ownership acquired during the delayed disclosure window, and the 
number of days between crossing the 5% threshold and filing the 13D. 
 This approach envisions the delayed disclosure fee as a mandatory 
payment for submitting a schedule 13D later than the date of acquiring 5% 
beneficial ownership.  While it would be a violation of the securities laws 
to submit a schedule 13D after the period authorized by the shareholder 
amendment to the firm’s bylaws, the hedge fund would not be obligated to 
wait until the conclusion of the authorized period.  This is precisely why 
ascertaining the social cost of delayed disclosure is such an important 
responsibility for a regulator looking out for the public good: regardless of 
the specific durations that individual firms authorize, the delayed 
disclosure fee will compel hedge funds to internalize the social cost of 
trading on asymmetric information. 
Similar to the private ordering system, the SEC likely could enact 
the delayed disclosure fee by administrative rule without statutory reform.  
The SEC’s authority to shorten the disclosure window is delineated by 
language referring solely to the duration of the window: “within such 
                                                 
183 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d–101 (listing the required elements of a schedule 13D filing, 
including “Date of Event Which Requires Filing of This Statement,” “Number of shares 
beneficially owned by each reporting person,” and “Percent of class represented by 
amount in Row 11”).  The relevancy of this data is explained infra in the discussion of 
computation of the filing fee. 
184 See id. (“The description of a transaction required by Item 5(c) shall include, but not 
necessarily be limited to: (1) The identity of the person covered by Item 5(c) who 
effected the transaction; (2) the date of transaction; (3) the amount of securities involved; 
(4) the price per share or unit; and (5) where and how the transaction was effected.”).  
Hedge funds could simply tabulate the average purchase price based on the transactions 
to be reported under item 5(c) that occurred during the delayed disclosure window. 
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shorter time as the Commission may establish by rule.”185  However, 
unlike an agency interpretation that the duration may be set on a firm-
specific basis, the imposition of a mandatory payment in exchange for a 
longer duration does not relate strictly to “establish[ing]” a “shorter time.”  
Accordingly, a rule imposing a delayed disclosure fee could not be upheld 
under the first step of the Chevron test for the validity of an agency 
interpretation of a statute because Congress has not “directly spoken to the 
precise question at issue.”186  Authority to impose a delayed disclosure fee 
is not “unambiguously” implied by the statutory text.187 
However, a delayed disclosure fee would likely be upheld under 
the second step of the Chevron test as a “permissible construction of the 
statute.”188  Because a rule enacting a delayed disclosure fee would be 
promulgated under an express delegation of authority by Congress, such a 
regulation would be “given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, 
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”189  A rule providing for a 
delayed disclosure fee would not likely be arbitrary or capricious, which 
requires showing that the SEC 
has relied on factors which Congress had not intended it to 
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of 
the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that 
runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so 
implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in 
view or the product of agency expertise.190 
                                                 
185 15 U.S.C.A § 78m(d)(1) (emphasis added). 
186 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 
(1984).   
187 Id. at 843. 
188 Id.  
189 Id. at 844; see, e.g., NTN Bearing Corp. of America v. United States, 368 F.3d 1369, 
1375-76 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (applying second prong of Chevron test and affirming the 
Department of Commerce’s construction of a statute because it is “neither arbitrary, 
capricious, nor manifestly contrary to the statute”). 
190 National Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 658 (2007) 
(quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). 
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As long as the SEC weighs all of the available alternatives, it would pass 
arbitrariness review.  A delayed disclosure fee would be rational to 
institute based on the considerations outlined in this Article. 
In addition, a delayed disclosure fee would not be considered 
“manifestly contrary to the statute.”  The language of section 929R of the 
Dodd-Frank Act does not limit the means by which the SEC may shorten 
the disclosure period.  Indeed, enacting a financial hurdle to delayed 
disclosure is one method by which the SEC can bring about a “shorter 
time” for disclosure.  Moreover, the House Committee on Financial 
Services report on section 929R—plainly appropriate to consult in 
Chevron step two191—supports the conclusion that the SEC’s authority is 
not limited solely to shortening reporting timeframes: 
This section provides the SEC with the authority to adopt 
rules to shorten reporting timeframes and help the markets 
receive more timely information concerning substantial 
ownership interests in issuers. This change is important for 
purposes of obtaining more accurate pricing of listed 
securities.192 
The italicized text indicates a broader congressional intent than simply 
shortening the disclosure period.  A delayed disclosure fee would further 
the purpose of obtaining “more accurate pricing of listed securities” by 
penalizing delays that cause prices to diverge from what they would be if 
the hedge fund’s accumulated ownership were known to the market. 
From an economic standpoint, a delayed disclosure fee would 
function as a “nonlinear corrective tax” where the rate is set equal to harm, 
which Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell have shown is a more efficient 
means of addressing externalities than linear taxes or quantity 
regulation.193  A nonlinear delayed disclosure fee would operate on both 
the price and quantity terms by increasing the rate with the proportion of 
                                                 
191 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863-66; Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a 
Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 704-07 (1995). 
192 H. Rep. No. 111-687, at 76 (2010) (emphasis added). 
193 Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, On the Superiority of Corrective Taxes to Quantity 
Regulation, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 4-5 (2002). 
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accumulated ownership.194  The precise rates would be set according to the 
proportional social harm caused by a given hedge fund trading on 
asymmetric information during the delayed disclosure window. 
To demonstrate how the delayed disclosure fee might be 
computed, consider the following hypothetical example.  Assume that the 
net social cost of delayed disclosure is a function of the number of days of 
delayed disclosure and the percentage of ownership acquired during the 
delayed disclosure period, as demonstrated by the following graph:195 
 
Figure 3: Social Cost of Delayed Disclosure Acquisition 
                                                 
194 For a discussion of internalizing social externalities utilizing price and quantity 
regulation, see generally Ian Ayres, Narrow Tailoring, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1781 (1996). 
195 As this Subsection focuses on setting an optimal fee on delayed disclosure, it omits a 
discussion of the gross social costs and benefits of delayed disclosure.  There is likely a 
social benefit to delayed disclosure from the increased monitoring and reduced 
managerial slack that hedge fund activists bring about.  Such a benefit would not result 
from increased shareholder value (e.g., in the form of more valuable investments held by 
the public), however, as this Article classifies this benefit as belonging to the firm.  
Nonetheless, there is likely some additional, residual benefit to society from greater 
corporate efficiency—one example might be lower unemployment than what would have 
otherwise resulted from firms’ failure brought about by excessive inefficiency.  However, 
as these benefits are particularly difficult to identify and likely small compared to the cost 
of trading on asymmetric information, it is reasonable to focus on the social cost of 
delayed disclosure, which this Article terms the “net” social cost. 




The y-axis of this graph approximates the social harm from trading in a 
given firm as a percent of the total purchase price paid by the hedge fund 
to acquire a given percent of ownership over a given number of days of 
delayed disclosure.  A delayed disclosure fee would simply be set equal to 
these percentages, as given by the following example table of rates:196 
 
Table 1: Heuristic Example of Delayed Disclosure Fee Rates 
 
# of 
Days % of Ownership Acquired During Delayed Disclosure Period 
0-2% 2-3% 3-4% 4-5% 5-6% 6-7% 7-8% 8-9% 9-10% 10+% 
1 0.05% 0.13% 0.25% 0.43% 0.65% 0.93% 1.25% 1.63% 2.05% 2.53% 
2 0.13% 0.20% 0.33% 0.50% 0.73% 1.00% 1.33% 1.70% 2.13% 2.60% 
3 0.25% 0.33% 0.45% 0.63% 0.85% 1.13% 1.45% 1.83% 2.25% 2.73% 
4 0.43% 0.50% 0.63% 0.80% 1.03% 1.30% 1.63% 2.00% 2.43% 2.90% 
                                                 
196 Both the graph and the table utilize a simple formula for calculating this example.  The 
fee rate is equal to the number of days squared, multiplied by 0.10/100.  The latter term 
scales the rate to a maximum of 10% for ten days. 
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5 0.65% 0.73% 0.85% 1.03% 1.25% 1.53% 1.85% 2.23% 2.65% 3.13% 
6 0.93% 1.00% 1.13% 1.30% 1.53% 1.80% 2.13% 2.50% 2.93% 3.40% 
7 1.25% 1.33% 1.45% 1.63% 1.85% 2.13% 2.45% 2.83% 3.25% 3.73% 
8 1.63% 1.70% 1.83% 2.00% 2.23% 2.50% 2.83% 3.20% 3.63% 4.10% 
9 2.05% 2.13% 2.25% 2.43% 2.65% 2.93% 3.25% 3.63% 4.05% 4.53% 
10 2.53% 2.60% 2.73% 2.90% 3.13% 3.40% 3.73% 4.10% 4.53% 5.00% 
 
For example, a hedge fund that obtains a total of 1,000,000 shares during 
the delayed disclosure period of a firm with 20,000,000 shares outstanding 
over five days of delayed disclosure would be required to pay a filing fee 
equal to 1.25% of the total purchase price.197  At an average purchase 
price of $10 per share, the filing fee would be approximately $125,000.198   
This is just a heuristic example of a hypothetical social cost of 
delayed disclosure.199  But it demonstrates how a nonlinear corrective fee 
might be imposed according to the social harm brought about by delayed 
blockholder disclosure.  In this example, the social cost and fee rate are a 
quadratic function of the number of days and the percentage of ownership 
acquired, scaled to a maximum rate of 5%.200 
                                                 
197 1,000,000 shares out of 20,000,000 shares outstanding = 5% of the outstanding shares.  
According to Table 1, if 5% of the outstanding shares are acquired over 5 days of delayed 
disclosure, the fee would be to 1.25% of the purchase price.  
198 The calculation is as follows: 1,000,000 shares acquired x $10/share x 1.25% fee = 
$125,000. 
199 A method of approximating the actual social cost will be considered shortly. 
200 A maximum rate of 5% was chosen as the median abnormal return to hedge fund 
activism within a (-20, 20) event day window found by Brav et al. was 5.6%.  Brav et al., 
supra note 74, at 1756.  This is not an argument for setting the fee equal to hedge funds’ 
median returns, but simply serves as a useful initial heuristic approximation of the 
maximum social cost that delayed disclosure might bring about.  The maximum fee rate 
is not set to 100% because the purpose of the filing fee is not to fully compensate victims 
of asymmetric trading but rather to induce a socially optimal level of hedge fund 
activism.  Imposing a fee equal to 100% of a hedge fund’s acquisition during the delayed 
disclosure window would render such purchases cost-prohibitive unless the hedge fund 
expected to obtain at least a 100% profit on the acquisition of these shares plus the initial 
5% block acquired at a discount.  This is a high hurdle to cross.  The funds from a lower 
delayed disclosure fee would partially compensate victims under the compensation 
scheme described in the next Subsection, but the primary goal of the filing fee is to 
induce the socially optimal level of activism.  
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Applying this example to the acquisition of J.C. Penney by 
Pershing Square and Vornado Realty Trust indicates that the delayed 
disclosure filing fee on the acquisitions during the ten-day window would 
be $37,135,864 and $6,002,398, respectively.201  These are far lower than 
the actual potential profits the hedge funds obtained, suggesting that the 
fee would not have prevented activism in this instance.   But it would have 
reduced the payoff of intervention and forced these hedge funds to 
internalize the approximate social cost of trading on asymmetric 
information during the delayed disclosure window. 
 Of course, the discussion thus far has only been a hypothetical 
example of how a nonlinear delayed disclosure fee might operate.  A 
greater challenge is to determine the correct rates, i.e., the empirical 
distribution of social cost resulting from delayed disclosure at different 
durations.  Initially, a quadratic function might be utilized, under the 
intuition that distrust in capital markets would become substantially worse 
for each additional day of delayed disclosure and each additional percent 
of ownership acquired.  But it is also essential to ascertain the more 
specific characteristics of the distribution of the social cost of delayed 
blockholder disclosure.  This cost may be discontinuous.  Certain levels of 
delayed disclosure may lead to a jump in distrust of capital markets.  
Accordingly, setting the fee rates with a quadratic function should only be 
a rough initial approximation. 
 Finding the empirical social cost of delayed disclosure can be 
accomplished through a continual process of surveying and 
experimentation.  The SEC might, for example, randomly survey market 
makers and individual investors upon the filing of a schedule 13D as to 
how the stealth acquisition of shares during delayed disclosure window 
                                                 
201 The calculation is as follows.  Pershing Square acquired 10.2% of J.C. Penney over a 
period of 10 days at a total purchase price of $742,717,279 (treating options as equal to 
the purchase price plus strike price and cash-settled total return swaps as equal to 
purchasing the underlying equity) * fee rate of 5% = $37,135,864.  Vornado acquired 
3.3% of J.C. Penney over a period of 10 days at a total purchase price of $219,868,049 
(treating options as with Pershing Square and forwards at the initial reference price) * 
2.73% =  $6,002,398.   
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affected bid/ask spreads and their participation in the market.202  The SEC 
could compare trading patterns of individual investors who had traded 
with a stealth acquirer to those who had not.  A well-designed empirical 
study could reveal much about the social cost of delayed disclosure.203 
2. Compensating Victims of Delayed Disclosure 
As described above, there are two primary sources of social cost 
imposed by delayed blockholder disclosure—one consequentialist and the 
other deontological.  It is essential to recognize at the outset that any 
efficient mechanism to internalize the social cost of delayed disclosure can 
necessarily only address these two sources imperfectly.  On the 
consequentialist level, it may be impossible to ensure that investors who 
sell shares to hedge funds trading on asymmetric information will be fully 
compensated while still preserving an efficient level of hedge fund 
activism.  This is because the pursuit of efficiency requires incentivizing 
the level of hedge fund activism that is optimal for a firm and society as a 
whole, even if that means transferring wealth from selling shareholders to 
the acquiring hedge fund.   
In other words, a relatively short disclosure delay may be optimal 
for firms and society as a whole, but it may still impose losses on trading 
counterparties that exceed any amount that can be internalized while still 
retaining an efficient level of activism.  On the deontological level, it may 
be that no monetary compensation can adequately remedy the injury to 
counterparties’ autonomy. 
Nonetheless, a compensation system should be instituted to 
ameliorate the injury to victims of trading on asymmetric information.  
This could be accomplished by establishing a dedicated fund to which the 
proceeds of the delayed disclosure fee would be directed.  Individuals or 
firms who sold shares during the delayed disclosure period prior to a 
                                                 
202 For a discussion of the use of randomization to set legal and regulatory policy, see 
generally Michael Abramowicz, Ian Ayres & Yair Listokin, Randomizing Law, 159 U. 
PENN. L. REV. 929 (2011). 
203 However, as discussed in the Appendix, finding a single optimal mandatory disclosure 
length for the distribution of the firm-specific costs and benefits of delayed blockholder 
disclosure is extraordinarily difficult. 
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blockholder’s schedule 13D announcement and during the number of days 
authorized by the private ordering amendment to the company’s bylaws 
would be eligible to receive compensation for their losses.   
The mechanics of the compensation system are straightforward.  
An investor’s “loss” should be defined as the difference between the 
investor’s sale price during the delayed disclosure window and the closing 
price on the first trading day following the schedule 13D filing.204  As 
administrator of the compensation scheme, the SEC could reduce an 
investor’s loss if there is objective evidence that the sale price or the 
closing price on the day of disclosure was depressed or inflated by some 
other, unrelated event such as a poor earnings announcement or sharp 
decline in the firm’s sector or market as a whole.205 
An investor’s “loss” would serve as a benchmark for a proportional 
allocation of the funds available in the compensation fund on a periodic 
basis.  If the total aggregate losses among investors in a given period (e.g. 
tax year) are equal to or less than the funds available in the compensation 
fund, every investor will receive full compensation for his or her losses.  
In the more likely scenario where the aggregate losses exceed the 
available funds, each investor will receive a proportion of the available 
funds equal to his or her proportion of the total losses.  For example, if 
aggregate losses total $1 million of which an investor has lost $100,000, 
but the available funds in the compensation fund for that tax year equal 
$500,000, that investor would receive $50,000.   
This definition of “loss” is similar to the approach utilized in 
traditional securities litigation.  Under Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. 
Broudo,206 in a securities fraud lawsuit “an inflated purchase price will not 
itself constitute or proximately cause the relevant economic loss.”207  
However, the Court emphasized, “[i]f the purchaser sells later after the 
                                                 
204 The closing price on the day after disclosure is more preferable than a later date, e.g., 
the ten-day post-disclosure closing price that was used to demonstrate a hedge fund’s 
potential profit in Section II.A.  Investors could presumably sell immediately upon the 
schedule 13D announcement to benefit from the higher share price, whereas the hedge 
fund could not realistically sell its entire stake on the day of disclosure (thus making a 
ten-day period a more reasonable comparison). 
205 See discussion infra p. 62. 
206 544 U.S. 336 (2005). 
207 Id. at 342. 
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truth makes its way into the marketplace, an initially inflated purchase 
price might mean a later loss.”208   
The Court’s statement in Dura reflects the rationale behind this 
Article’s proposal to define an investor’s “loss” from delayed blockholder 
disclosure as the difference between the sale price and the closing price on 
the date of the schedule 13D filing.  An announcement that a hedge fund 
has acquired over 5% of the beneficial ownership of a reporting company 
is the disclosure of material information, i.e., the “truth mak[ing] its way 
into the marketplace.”  The closing price as of the day immediately after 
the 13D announcement most likely reflects the effect of the disclosure on 
the share price rather than other factors. 
Permitting the SEC to adjust the “loss” calculation based on 
objective evidence that some other factor affected the share price either at 
the time of sale or on the day of disclosure comports with the following 
rationale articulated by the Court in Dura: 
When the purchaser subsequently resells such shares, even 
at a lower price, that lower price may reflect, not the earlier 
misrepresentation, but changed economic circumstances, 
changed investor expectations, new industry-specific or 
firm-specific facts, conditions, or other events, which taken 
separately or together account for some or all of that lower 
price.209 
To the extent that an investor’s loss was caused by some factor other than 
delayed blockholder disclosure, it should not be compensable under this 
compensation regime.210 
Unlike with securities fraud, however, articulating a clear standard 
for disproving causation in the delayed disclosure context is challenging.  
In Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., the Second Circuit held that  
“a plaintiff must allege . . . that the subject of the fraudulent statement or 
                                                 
208 Id. at 342. 
209 Id. at 342-43. 
210 Admittedly, this would be difficult to establish in practice, but such an adjustment 
should be provided for to ensure that the compensation system is not being exploited to 
simply insure against downturns in share prices. 
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omission was the cause of the actual loss suffered.”211  With delayed 
blockholder disclosure, however, there is no specific “subject of the 
fraudulent statement or omission” beyond the lack of filing a schedule 
13D prior to the moment of trading and the simultaneous non-disclosure 
of the blockholder’s accumulated stake.  Accordingly, while it is quite 
reasonable for the SEC to use the difference in the closing price on the day 
of disclosure and the purchase price as a presumption of an investor’s loss, 
it is difficult to identify a set of objective criteria that the SEC could 
employ to discount this sum in response to other factors.   
The most practicable solution is simply to entrust the SEC with the 
discretion to adjust the claim by major firm-specific, sector, or market-
related developments, but otherwise to rely on the share price differential 
as a reasonable approximation of an investor’s loss.  Unlike with securities 
fraud litigation, erring on the side of generally awarding investors “too 
much” would not lead to excessive recovery.  Under this proposal, the 
compensation system would apportion the available funds according to 
investors’ relative loss.  As long as any error in computing investors’ 
losses is distributed similarly across investors, this would not lead to any 
single investor receiving an excessive recovery because the proportional 
shares for distributing the available funds would remain identical.212 
Again, the purpose of this compensation system is not to fully 
recompense victims of trading with asymmetric information.213  From a 
social welfare perspective, the pursuit of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency—
produing gains to society that exceed losses—is normatively superior.  
The fundamental goal of the filing fee proposal is to induce socially 
efficient durations of delayed blockholder disclosure.  However, within 
this framework, it is possible to ameliorate the injury of information 
asymmetries using a redistributive compensation system. 
                                                 
211 396 F.3d 161, 173 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Suez 
Equity Investors, L.P. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 250 F.3d 87, 95 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
212 However, relative disparities between investors may still result under this proposal if 
certain investors are able to make a greater loss claim because of external factors and the 
SEC cannot unequivocally distinguish these cases from cases where the loss is truly 
caused by delayed disclosure. 
213 As noted previously, deontological harm simply may not be compensable. 




This Article’s contribution is simple: in the debate over 
blockholder disclosure, we have been asking the wrong questions.  It is not 
enough merely to point to the fact that hedge fund activism might benefit 
target firms.  Nor is Congress’s intent from the 1960s dispositive 
regarding the role hedge funds should play in corporate governance today.  
The important question is what legal rule would maximize the net benefit 
to society as a whole.  Society is better off when outside blockholders 
reduce managerial slack and agency costs—but only when doing so does 
not come at the expense of long-term value creation.  Society is worse off 
when trading on asymmetric information engenders distrust in capital 
markets and violates the autonomy of parties who are less informed.  Any 
policy solution must take into account these costs and benefits. 
Private ordering is the best solution to finding an optimal balance.  
No party has a better incentive to reduce managerial slack and enhance 
long-term value than a firm’s shareholders.  Allowing firms to opt-out of 
immediate disclosure through a shareholders’ amendment to the bylaws 
puts the power in shareholders’ hands to allow the level of delayed 
disclosure optimal for each firm.  But we also cannot ignore the social cost 
of trading on asymmetric information.  The SEC should impose a delayed 
disclosure fee that would reflect the harm suffered by society when hedge 
funds profit from the non-disclosure of material, nonpublic information 
regarding share accumulation and control intent.  A compensation fund 
would soften the blow of trading while a better informed trading 
counterparty exploited a legally sanctioned delayed disclosure window. 
The approach suggested by this Article has implications for other 
areas of securities law as well.  Too often policymakers have imposed a 
suboptimal mandatory rule instead of balancing costs and benefits and 
considering empowerment approaches such as opt-out, taxing, and 
compensation.  Insider trading is a prime example.  With so many 
resources spent on enforcing an absolute ban,214 we should at least 
                                                 
214 See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, IN BRIEF: FY 2013 CONGRESSIONAL 
JUSTIFICATION 13, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secfy13congbudgjust.pdf (FY 
2012 estimated expenses for the Division of Enforcement total $467,317,000 and request 
for FY 2013 is $512,854,000). 
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consider the alternatives.  A private ordering approach coupled with a tax 
on insiders’ profits and compensation for victims could enhance price 
accuracy while ameliorating the injury to trading counterparties.   
Regulators might even reconsider mandatory rules entirely, as 
transactional bargaining could facilitate even greater efficiency.215 
For blockholder disclosure, a private ordering solution is the place 
to start.  As financial innovation makes acquiring equity ownership faster 
than ever, ten days of deceptive trading may induce substantial instability 
and among target firms and a detrimental focus on short-term results.  
Numerous accounting scandals over the years have shown the cost of 
ascribing too much weight to quarterly earning reports.  For society as a 
whole, the day may come when ten days of legally sanctioned exploitation 
of information asymmetries would impose too great of a price on 
participation in the capital markets for many retail investors. 
On the other hand, eliminating the disclosure window entirely may 
very well drive away those investors who Jonathan Macey correctly called 
“the last bidders who still may be able to make money in the market for 
corporate control.”216  In the face of empirical evidence that hedge fund 
activism may benefit target firms, we should ask ourselves whether 
removing this financial incentive is the right approach.  The truth may not 
always be in the middle,217 but when it comes to blockholder disclosure, 
the optimal solution requires a careful balance. 
                                                 
215 See generally Brams & Mitts, supra note 137, at [•] (advocating bargaining 
mechanisms for blockholder disclosure and more generally). 
216 Jonathan Macey, Uncle Sam and the Hostile Takeover, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 21, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704608504576208900109315200.html. 
217 See ROBERT J. GULA, NONSENSE: A HANDBOOK OF LOGICAL FALLACIES 102 (2002) 
(discussing the false mean fallacy). 




VI. APPENDIX: A SIMPLE MODEL AND CHALLENGES OF 
STATISTICAL INFERENCE 
A central thesis of this Article is that both the costs and benefits of 
delayed blockholder disclosure must be considered when setting 
regulatory policy.  There is no a priori justification for concluding that ten 
days promotes an optimal level of hedge fund activism for target firms and 
society at large.  Conceptually, the optimal disclosure window x is the 
length of time that incentivizes the level of hedge fund activism with the 
aggregate marginal benefit from monitoring management equal to its 
aggregate marginal cost, which consists of the sum of the firm-specific 
costs of short-termism plus the economic and non-economic social costs 
of delayed disclosure.  It is helpful to consider this equation algebraically: 
bi(x) = the total benefit to firm i from blockholder 
disclosure duration x 
ci(x) = the total cost to firm i from blockholder disclosure 
duration x 
n = the number of firms subject to the Exchange Act 
reporting requirements 
 
B(x) =  b1(x) + b2(x) + . . . + bn(x)  
C(x) =  c1(x) + c2(x) + . . . + cn(x)  
S(x) = the total cost to society from blockholder disclosure 
duration x. 
The optimal aggregate duration x would then be given by: 
(1) B’(x) = C’(x) + S’(x) 
where f’(x) = f(x). 
  
The problem, of course, is that bi(x), ci(x), and S(x) are unknown.  
There is no predefined mathematical function giving the exact costs and 
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benefits of delayed blockholder disclosure.  Moreover, while it might be 
possible to use surveys and experimental techniques to discover the firm-
specific benefits, costs, and social cost of delayed blockholder disclosure 
at different durations, problems of estimation remain.  Consider the 
following general form of a parametric model to estimate the coefficients 
for the correlation between different durations of delayed disclosure and 
the corresponding costs and benefits: 
(2) B = mB(βB, X, ϵB) 
C = mC(βC, X, ϵC)  
S = mS(βS, X, ϵS)  
where  B = observed aggregate firm-specific benefits,  
C = observed aggregate firm-specific costs,  
S = observed social costs, 
m = a parametric model of the data, 
β = parameters to be estimated by m, 
X = different delayed durations, 
ϵ = random error terms 
In theory, once the parameters βB, βC, and βS are estimated, the 
functions B(x), C(x), or S(x) could be approximated and the optimal value 
of x estimated by equation (1).  However, it may be difficult to find an 
appropriate functional form for the models mB, mC, and mS to fit the 
distribution of B, C, and S.  For example, as discussed above, the social 
cost of delayed disclosure may “jump up” at various levels.  Individual 
firm costs and benefits, e.g., bi(x) and ci(x), may be wildly unpredictable, 
e.g., if certain firms would experience an extraordinarily high cost for 
short disclosure while others might derive great benefit from hedge fund 
activism.  In this case, the random errors ϵB, ϵC, and ϵS would not 
necessarily be normally distributed.  Hypothesis testing based on 
traditional assumptions of normality of the errors would be inconsistent.  
More fundamentally, estimating confidence intervals is extremely 
challenging without an accurate population model. 
Put differently, the optimal disclosure length for individual firms 
may be so unpredictable that it may be impracticable to identify an ideal 
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universal mandatory duration.  This suggests that the right approach to 
reforming the blockholder disclosure window is to adopt a legal rule that 
encourages each firm i to find the optimal disclosure length xi for itself, 
taking into account the social cost of such a duration.  Indeed, even if a 
mandatory duration could be estimated statistically, it is still likely to be 
inferior to a private ordering solution that induces an optimal duration for 
each firm.  A single duration would necessarily be over- and under-
inclusive compared to a firm-specific approach.  In algebraic terms, the 
optimal firm-specific duration xi for firm i is given by: 
(3) b’i(xi) = c’i(xi) + S ̂’i(xi) 
where S ̂i(xi) = the proportional total social cost of delayed 
disclosure attributable to firm i from delayed blockholder 
disclosure with duration xi. 
Equation (3) brings us one step closer to a concrete policy proposal 
to reforming the section 13(d) blockholder disclosure window.  The ideal 
rule should encourage the discovery of xi by equalizing each firm’s 
marginal benefit and marginal cost functions from delayed blockholder 
disclosure plus the marginal proportional social cost of such a delay xi 
attributable to firm i.  Moreover, it is essential to consider the population 
distribution of B, C, and S.  In particular, if S is nonlinear, internalizing the 
social cost of delayed blockholder disclosure would require a more 
sophisticated approach than simply imposing a flat fee on delayed 
disclosure.  This is discussed further in Section IV.C. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
